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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MIGRATION
by
Yun Wang
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Hakan Yilmazkuday, Major Professor
This dissertation encompasses three different topics on international trade and mi-
gration. The first chapter is the introduction. The second chapter investigates the
short run effects of regional trade agreements on trade costs. It is widely accepted
that the reinforcement of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) aiming at trade costs
reduction among trade partners requires time. This paper investigates the effects
of RTAs on trade costs over time by using unique micro-price data. As a key factor
compared to the literature, excluding the local distribution costs, the trade costs we
calculated are based on the arbitrage condition to equalize traded input prices across
international cities. We confirm that having an RTA on average lowers trade costs
significantly. Furthermore, data shows significant and negative effects of RTAs on
trade costs over time. Specifically, besides the initial impact on trade costs, having
an RTA continuously lower trade costs every year after the commencement of the
RTA.
Gravity variables such as distance, common language, colonial ties, free trade
agreements, and adjacency are used to capture the effects of trade costs in empir-
ical studies. The third chapter decomposes the overall effects of gravity variables
on trade through three gravity channels: duties/tariffs (DC), transportation-costs
(TC), and dyadic-preferences (PC). When PC is ignored as is typical in the lit-
erature, it is shown that nearly all gravity effects are trough distance; 29 percent
vi
through DC and 71 percent through TC. However, the additional channel of PC
is introduced and shown to dominate other channels, with adjacency contributing
about 45 percent, distance about 32 percent, colonial ties about 14 percent, free
trade agreements about 7 percent, and common language about 2 percent. These
results imply that gravity variables mainly capture the effects of demand shifters
rather than supply shifters (as implied by the existing literature). The results are
further connected to several existing discussions in the literature, such as welfare
gains from trade and the distance puzzle.
The fourth chapter utilizes an immigration inflow data set from OECD countries
during the period of 1984 to 2015 to shed lights on how institutional quality affects
the immigration rate. With the analysis in the fixed-effects framework, we construct
a set of country-time specific institutional quality indexes to examine their effects
on the immigration rate. The paper shows that other than the network effects,
GDP difference, and migration costs, institutional qualities in both destination and
source countries matter when it comes to potential migration decisions. Specifically,
better socioeconomic conditions in the destination countries, and worse foreign debt,
budget balance, government stability, internal conflicts, and corruption conditions
in the source countries increase the immigration inflow.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The gravity model has been introduced into numerous empirical international
trade and migration studies for decades. Gravity variables share bilateral informa-
tion such as distance, common language, border, colonial ties, and regional trade
agreements. They have been employed to connect trade and migration through
a number of economic activities at source and destination countries. Specifically,
gravity variables have been mainly used as proxies for trade costs and migration
costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).
Trade costs include both observable and unobservable elements such as trans-
portation costs, tariffs, duties, searching costs and information/language barriers.
Migration costs represent physical and cultural barriers occurred when migrants re-
allocate. This dissertation mainly focuses on the gravity model and how well the
gravity variables can explain trade and migration. Therefore, three questions have
been asked in the following chapters: (i) how regional trade agreements affect trade
costs, especially when there is evidence that time is required for a trade agreement
to come into force, (ii) what are the gravity channels on trade, especially concerning
the preferences factors, and (iii) do institutional quality of both destination and
source countries matter when potential migrants decide to reallocate. I use theory
and data to provide quantitative answers to these questions.
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are one of the most important gravity vari-
ables in international trade literature. The second chapter explores the effects of
RTAs on trade costs. The literature shows different results of the elasticity on trade
due to the specialized data sets, sample sizes and methodologies. Cipollina and
Salvatici (2010) used meta-analysis to summarize the existing empirical results.
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The results support the hypothesis that having an RTA increase trade flows between
two countries significantly.
Understanding the gravity effects is the key for economists to figure out how
elastic trade is with respect to changes in trade frictions. However, the gravity vari-
ables regarding bilateral attributes are mainly used for trade frictions approximation
instead of trade flows, it is best to choose trade costs as the main focus in our study.
Due to the limitation of the trade costs data, existing literature transfers to use
micro-level price data and the arbitrage condition as a measurement of trade costs
(Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Simonovska and Waugh, 2014; Yilmazkuday, 2016). This
method to proxy trade costs has the advantage of covering the widest range of def-
inition of trade frictions from the observable (direct) costs, such as transportation
costs and duties/tariffs, to the unobservable (indirect) costs, such as information
costs, search costs, and potentially the preferences from the demand side.
This measurement of trade costs also gets improved when we use it in this chap-
ter. We distinguish the sources of the price differentials in two locations from in-
ternational trade frictions and local distribution costs. Crucini and Yilmazkuday
(2014) suggests to distinguish retail prices in the data by both trade and non-traded
input prices. Therefore, the trade costs acquired through the arbitrage condition
only come from the trade-input prices other than the non-traded inputs, where the
latter is mainly treated as local distribution costs.
Using the arbitrage condition and the prices of 22 tradable goods recorded from
102 major cities in 58 countries, the second chapter investigates the effects of RTAs
on trade costs in the fixed effects framework. We examine the robustness of the ex-
isting conclusion of negative effect of the RTA dummy variable on trade costs. One
step further to investigate phased-in effect of RTAs, we create a new time-related
variable to indicate the year after an RTA entered into force. The empirical model
2
contains the log term of trade costs on the left-hand side, gravity variable, time-
related RTA variable, and fixed effect for unobserved heterogeneity on the right-hand
side. We also consider the endogeneity problem and different robustness tests. The
results show that the average regional trade agreements have significant anticipatory
effects on trade costs and continue to affect trade costs after the trade deals begin.
The third chapter tries to distinguish the effect of the gravity variables between
trade costs and dyadic-preferences. Head and Mayer (2013) point out that only 30%
of the trade flow variations can be explained by observable trade costs data, such as
transportation costs and duties/tariffs. Almost 70% of the variations of trade flows
come from unobservable dark costs that consist of the information barriers, con-
sumers preferences and producers pricing to market, etc. It is understandable that
the gravity/dyadic variables may also capture the demand-side preferences. Ander-
son (2011) also addressed this concern as the difficulty to distinguish demand-side
home bias from the effect of trade cost, since the dyadic variables pick up both the
demand and the supply side.
Although the existing literature has used these gravity variables extensively,
there have not been sufficient attempts to decompose the overall gravity effects on
trade (across time and space) into those through direct versus indirect trade costs.
This has been mostly due to data limitations on trade costs, especially indirect trade
costs. Thanks to the detailed data on U.S. imports and the corresponding measured
trade costs, our study has achieved to identify the effects of gravity channel on direct
costs and preferences, and externalized the indirect costs.
We first develop a simple theoretical model considering the imports of the U.S. at
the individual goods level, optimization problems of individuals in the U.S, and the
firms profit maximization problem in the source countries. We follow the standard
approach as our consumer utility function has constant elasticity of substitution,
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the iceberg trade cost is introduced at destination prices and the cost function is
linear. To differentiate the effects of gravity/dyadic variables on preferences and
trade cost, two types of preferences will be considered. The first type is random
preferences, which implies that gravity/dyadic variables only capture the effects of
measured trade costs. The second type is dyadic preferences, which implies that
gravity variables not only capture the effects of measured trade costs but also those
of preferences treated as error term in a typical gravity regression.
In this study, overall effects of gravity variables on trade are mostly shown to be
through dyadic preferences rather than the measured trade costs of transportation
costs or duties/tariffs. This additional channel of dyadic preferences has not been
given enough importance in the existing literature, mostly due to the lack of avail-
able data on the subject.
Similar to international trade, international migration is also a key component
of modern globalization. The fourth chapter focus on the other side of the story
by using gravity models in the analysis on international migration. It seems that
the institutional quality of a country affects the human capital flow and introduces
different effects in the destination and source countries. Much of the migration lit-
erature (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Dreher et al., 2011; Dimant et al., 2013;
Fitzgerald et al., 2014; Hatton and Williamson, 2003; Mayda, 2010) focuses on only
one or some aspects of the institutional quality of a country, such as political insta-
bility, social and economic issues, conflicts, and corruption. This paper contributes
to the existing literature by constructing a set of institutional quality indexes to
consider all the possible socioeconomic and political conditions.
We use an updated source-country specific immigration inflow data set from 33
OECD destination countries between 1984 and 2015 to examine the gravity model
in migration. Combining institutional quality indexes from the International Coun-
4
try Risk Guide (ICRG), this paper shows the importance of institutional quality in
both destination and source countries in determining the migration flow.
The modified empirical model summarizes the findings in the previous studies.
The common gravity variables as proxies for the migration costs affect migration flow
negatively, such as geographic distance, common border, colonial ties, and common
language. The results of the estimations also show that one of the most important
factors is network effects from existing immigration stocks in the destination coun-
try. These network effects provide information to potential immigrants from family
and friends who reside in the destination countries. As predicted, network effects
reduce the migration costs, and increase the chance for potential immigrants to land
jobs and settle after reallocation.
Last but not least, the innovation of this paper is to incorporate the unique
institutional quality measurements into explaining the pull and push effects in the
model. This is the first study to fully integrate both economic and political, pull
and push effects with institutional quality indexes to explain the patterns of migra-
tion flow. The results are aligned with the literature, where institutional quality
matters for the determination of migration. Better socioeconomic condition in the
destination countries, worse debt and budget conditions, lower stability of the gov-
ernment, more internal conflicts and corruption in the source countries yield larger
immigration inflows from source to destination countries.
The policy implications are important for developing and underdeveloped coun-
tries specifically. These countries should create related policies to retain their labor
force and citizens, and prevent brain-drain effects which could potentially impact
the labor market and economic growth of those countries in the long run.
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CHAPTER 2
ON REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TRADE COSTS
2.1 Introduction
The gravity model has been the empirical workhorse for studying bilateral trade.
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are one of the most important gravity variables
in the international trade literature. Even though not all of the motivations to form
RTAs are based on economic considerations (WTO, 2011), it is the case that when
forming an RTA, trade partners aim at the promotion of trade and the reduction of
trade barriers. Therefore, we would expect RTAs to reduce trade costs and create
additional trade flows among trade partners.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the effects of RTAs on trade costs, since the
benefits of negotiating RTAs are twofold (RTAs potentially lead to the decreasing
of trade costs and increasing of bilateral trade flows). There are a few studies that
attempt to emphasize how policies impact the changes of trade costs. The topic
is gaining more attention due to the rapid increase in the number of RTAs during
the past few decades. The contents and the scope of the RTAs have consider-
ably expanded at the same time. Recently, signed RTAs tend to be categorized as
”deep integration” agreements, due to the fact that the new agreements go beyond
conventional market access issues. They are not limited to only the promotion of
preferential tariffs and their elimination, but recently formed RTAs encompass a
broad range of trade-related issues, in particular, trade facilitation issues. RTAs
deal more with ”behind-the-border” policies and domestic regulations that aim at
increasing the efficiency of entire trade procedures. Therefore, trade facilitation, as
an important element, is now systematically included in most newly formed RTAs
8
From the perspective of trade costs, we can also see the impact from the trans-
formation of the RTAs with respect to trade facilitation. As tariffs and all the
other quantitative restrictions on trade, such as freight rate, have fallen over recent
decades, attention has shifted towards the reduction to the other forms of trade
barriers in RTA negotiations. Through the wide acceptance of the broad trade costs
definition in Anderson and Wincoop (2004), we recognize that tariffs only account
for less than 5% of the overall ad valorem equivalent trade costs. Trade facilitation
has the potential to have a greater impact on trade costs by potentially changing the
poor trade infrastructure and logistic service markets, both of which contribute to
larger trade barriers between partners. Nevertheless, given the obvious motivations
for the promotion of trade facilitation in RTA negotiation, does having an RTA truly
help trade partners in reducing their trade costs with each other? We attempt to
answer this question in this paper. Most importantly, we are seeking to understand
how to quantify the effects of RTAs on trade costs, since there is a lack of literature
addressing this issue in a more general form.
Several recent studies explore the effects of RTAs on trade costs. Emphasizing
the significant impact of trade facilitation provisions in RTAs, Duval et al. (2016)
ask whether including trade facilitation in RTAs truly helps trade partners reduce
their trade costs. They create a variable that denotes the number of trade facilitation
provisions in all the RTAs to which both trade partners belong. As a replacement
of the standard RTA dummy variable, this main explanatory variable helps the
authors find that each additional trade facilitation provision in an RTA cuts the
trade costs of both trade partners by 1%. By differentiating between the types
of RTAs, Miroudot and Shepherd (2012) address the question of whether services
RTAs have any impact on trade costs. In the case of services, they find a modest
6.5% decrease in trade costs if trade partners have service RTAs. By focusing on
9
the regionalization of trade in East Asia, Pomfret and Sourdin (2009) define trade
costs as the difference between free-on-boat (fob) values when a good reaches the
port in the exporting country and import values that include the cost, insurance and
freight (cif). Additionally, they argue that the trade costs of East Asian countries
dropped over the whole regionalization period. However, they do not include the
RTA variable as an explanatory variable in the regression analysis. Therefore, there
is potential exogeneity bias in their results, as they cannot explain whether it is the
trade agreement that reduces the trade costs.
Studies in the field of Economics focusing on RTAs and trade costs seemingly
lack a formal analysis of the structured gravity model. On the other hand, more
standard gravity studies mainly focus on the effects of RTAs on bilateral trade flows.
Studies show different results of RTA elasticity of trade volume (after treatment
effects of RTAs) due to the specialized data sets, sample sizes and methodologies.
Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) use meta-analysis to summarize the empirical results
of 1,827 estimates gathered from a set of 85 studies. The random effects estimate
demonstrated a 65% increase in trade with RTAs. After filtering biases and impacts,
the meta-analysis confirmed the robust and positive impact of RTAs on trade flows,
which contribute to an increase of approximately 40%. As a comparison to the
random effects estimator, the more modest fixed effects estimate, which drops the
after treatment effects of the RTAs to approximately 10%, is demonstrated to be
unreliable because of the undermined obvious heterogeneity when authors try to
compare different RTAs. Moreover, due to the limitations of cross-sectional analysis,
comparing the estimates in different time frames with different RTAs shows the
upper trending results over the time, which undermines the “consequence of the
evolution from shallow to deep trade agreements,” as the author describes in the
study.
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However, we still can not accurately quantify the effects of RTAs with concrete
support, due to the endogeneity problem of the RTA dummy variable. This problem
has been documented in many studies. Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) propose a ”nat-
ural trading partner” hypothesis, which states that two countries tend to form an
RTA if they already have significant international trade between them, and form-
ing of an RTA will create additional trade. Magee (2003) considers the question
of whether a higher level of trade flows will cause the formation of RTAs. Using
a simultaneous model, he confirms the higher likelihood of forming RTAs due to
high trade flow level. As formally addressed in Baier and Bergstrand (2007), trade
policy is not an exogenous variable. RTAs could be one of the reasons for trade
expansion. It is also plausible that there is tendency for countries to form more
RTAs for further integration when their bilateral trade is already larger than with
countries that have comparatively small trade flows. Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
suggest the panel approach with different fixed effects: adding bilateral fixed and
county-time effects yields almost a quintupled effect of RTA in the literature on
trade flows, which means the existence of an RTA doubles the trade flow of both
countries.
Along with the many challenges introduced by the endogeneity problem, the
gravity model estimates of RTA effects are also sensitive to the sample size, sample
selection for country pairs, types of RTAs, and the differences in the time periods.
Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) cite multiple ”implausible results” in their MATA
study and find the evidence in the studies of RTAs using the gravity model to be
sensitive. Haveman and Hummels (1998) show that changing the sample of countries
results in a different predictions of trade flows, which results in very different RTA
effects in their study. Additionally, Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) point out that the
11
estimation results in the gravity model are very sensitive to the variables included
in the regression and to the prior beliefs of the researchers.
The panel approach and time-series data bring up another question. Intuitively,
the effects of an RTA are time-related, which makes it impossible to capture all the
effects by the time the agreement enters into force. Are there phased-in effects of
RTAs on trade flows and how can they be captured? Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
use lagged terms of RTA to show that the effects of RTAs can be extended up to
10 years, with an overall 114% increase in the trade level. With a similar approach,
Magee (2008) concludes that, on average, RTAs would affect trade for up to 11 years
after the initial impact.
Most of the literature uses macro data on trade flows or measures trade costs
derived from different theoretical models using observable trade data (Novy, 2011;
Jacks, Meissner and Novy, 2007). We try to use micro price data in this study to
obtain trade costs through the arbitrage condition. This strategy is commonly used
in the literature, such as in the studies of D. Yilmazkuday and H. Yilmazkuday
(2016), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Simonovska and Waugh (2014). Due to the
lack of a direct measurement, studies find an alternative way to measure trade costs
through the retail price data. In Eaton and Kortum (2002), the model indicates
that the relative trade shares of two trade partners is a product of the relative price
and the geographic barriers, which are regulated by the elasticity θ (also known
as the comparative advantage in the study). To obtain θ, they use the standard
trade flows data, and proxy geographic barriers from country n to country i ”dni”
by the relative price. In detail, they assume that for any given commodity, the
log term of the relative price in two locations is bounded above log ”dni”. They
take the highest value of these relative price terms across commodities to obtain
the measurement of log ”dni”. These trade costs capture much broader definitions,
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which include direct and indirect trade costs, the price to marking and potential
preferences from the demand side. In D. Yilmazkuday and H. Yilmazkuday (2017),
the authors obtain trade costs in a similar way, but the specification of trade costs
in their study is more precise. Their definition of trade costs obtained through
the arbitrage condition is narrowed by excluding the local distribution costs. The
purpose of our study requires us to adopt the trade costs with the narrowed the
definition.
Can we examine the phased-in effect of RTAs through micro-level disaggregated
price data? We want to know the effects of RTAs on trade over time. With the
standard approach, the exchange rate captures the short-run price volatility, and the
trade costs contribute to the long-run price divergence, which causes most gravity
model estimations to focus on the long-run effects rather than the short-run fluctua-
tions. Would this short-run trade costs volatility caused by RTA statues change over
time? By using micro-price data at the city level, this paper investigates the effects
of the RTA variable on trade costs. With the advantage of the data set, prices of 39
goods recorded from 102 major cities in 58 countries are separated by non-traded
goods (local retail cost) and traded goods (traded input price). The updated RTA
dummy variables are incorporated with a group of gravity variables such as distance,
common language and boarder, etc. from Reuven and Rose (2016). The entire time
span is from 2010 to 2016. The methodology to determine trade costs is through the
arbitrage condition by the measurement of the traded input price differential across
cities (intranational and international). Our trade costs, calculated by traded input
prices, cover the direct and indirect trade costs (duties/tariffs, transportation costs,
information and language barriers) but do not include distribution costs at the des-
tination. We examine the robustness of the existing conclusion of the negative effect
of the RTA dummy variable on trade costs. We go one step further to investigate
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the phased-in effect of RTAs. We created a new variable to indicate the year after
an RTA entered into force. The empirical model contains the log term of trade costs
on the left-hand side, the RTA dummy variable, a time-related RTA variable, other
gravity variables and a fixed effect for unobserved heterogeneity. We also consider
the endogeneity problem of the gravity variable RTA with different robustness tests
at the end as a comparison. As a conclusion, the random effects estimator has the
most consistent and negative after-treatment effects for RTAs on trade costs. The
after-treatment effects for the time-related RTA variable are inconsistent when we
switch form the random effects estimator to different fixed effects estimators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the method for
obtaining our trade costs, excluding the local distribution costs. Section 3 provides
the empirical estimation methodologies with mixed random effects and fixed effects
estimators, considering multilateral resistant terms or not. Section 4 summarizes
the empirical results together with many robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Trade Costs Measurement and Specification
In this section, we present a specific way to determine the after-treatment effects
of RTAs on trade costs by proxying trade costs in a novel way through micro-price
data and the arbitrage condition. Most of the literature conducts a gravity study
on trade by using the bilateral trade flows or trade flows with a specific direction
as the independent variable. There are many reasons that the gravity studies on
trade costs are limited. One of the main reasons is the easy access to the trade
flows data from a wide range of goods and services categories, country selections
and year spans. The other reason is that the trade costs data are difficult to acquire
in practice. In most cases, the trade costs we can get from the existing data are
14
very limited to specific time frames and selections1, which would cause problems,
especially when we are using panel data instead of long-run analysis with the cross-
sectional data. The other concern is indirect (dark) costs. Head and Mayer (2013)
point out that only 30% of the trade flow variations can be explained by observable
trade costs data, such as transportation costs and duties/tariffs. Almost 70% of the
variations of trade flows come from unobservable costs that consist of information
barriers, consumers preferences and producers pricing to market, etc.
2.2.1 Trade-input Price Acquisition
Due to the limitation of the trade costs data, many existing studies use micro-
level price data and the arbitrage condition as a measurement of trade costs2. This
method to proxy trade costs has the advantage of covering the widest range of
definitions of trade barriers from the observable (direct) costs, such as transportation
costs and duties/tariffs, to the unobservable (indirect) costs3, such as information
costs, search costs, and potentially the preferences from the demand side. The
difference in this paper is that the trade costs we use are international trade costs.
This can distinguish the sources of the price differentials of two locations (in this
paper, we analyze city pairs) from international barriers and local distribution costs.
Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014) suggest that we should distinguish retail prices in
1For example, we have the most detailed international trade data from USITC
(http://dataweb.usitc.gov/), including the detailed information of the calculated duties,
the costs of all freight, insurance, and other charges incurred. However, it only covers the
data between trading partners of US. and US. itself.
2Andrews, Berry and Jia (2004), Andrews and Guggenberger (2009), Andrews and
Soares (2010), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Ponomareva and Tamer (2011), Rosen (2008)
and Simonovska and Waugh (2014).
3In Head and Mayer (2013), they describe the whole bundle of these unobservable
trade barrier as ”dark costs”.
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the data by both trade and non-traded input prices. Therefore, the trade costs
we obtain through the arbitrage condition should only come from the trade-input
prices rather than the non-traded inputs, where the latter is mainly treated as
local distribution costs. The other reason that we use this specification of trade
costs, excluding the local distribution costs, is that the purpose of this paper is
to analyze the after treatment effects of RTAs, currency unions and other bilateral
gravity variables. We do not want to add any elements of trade barriers outside
of the costs occurring during crossing the boarders. Thus, the changes of local
retailer/distribution costs are not affected by the after-treatment effects of RTAs,
CUs and other gravity variables. To control the retail prices of traded goods from
the local distribution costs, we follow the methodology in the studies to untangle
the trade costs in this paper.
We know that the retail prices of traded goods reflect the optimum resources
reallocation decisions among technologies, production inputs etc. Based on the
model introduced in Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014), the definition of the retail
prices of any tradeable good is in a Cobb-Douglas form, as shown below:
Pij =
Wαii Q
1−αi
ij
Aj
(2.1)
where Pij is the retail price of a traded good i in location j, Wi is the local wage
or local input price in location i, Qij is the good specific trade-input price of good i
in location j, Aj is a location specific total-factor-productivity in location j. In the
model, αi is good specific local wage input share for good i that is universal across
all locations. The pattern obviously shows that the retail price of good i in location
j increases whenever the total-factor-Productivity at location j Aj drops, and the
local wage Wj, and traded-input price Qij increase.
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Additionally, using the equation above, we can obtain the relative retail price of
good i between location j and k as follows:
Pij
Pik
=
Ak
Aj
(
Wj
Wk
)αi (Qij
Qik
)1−αi
(2.2)
After linearizing equation (2.2) with logs, we have the following:
pijk = −ajk + αiwjk + (1− αi)qijk (2.3)
where pijk = log(Pij/Pik),ajk = log(Aj/Ak),wjk = log(Wj/Wk), and qijk = log(Qij/Qik).
The relative retail price for a specific good pijk is available from the data, and
the relative price of traded inputs qijk for a particular good is used to calculate the
trade costs through the arbitrage condition. For the identification process of Qijk,
we follow the two-stage approach to control for the local distribution/retail costs.
In line with Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014), we use the geometric mean regres-
sion (GMR) in equation (2.3) with some modification in the retail prices and wage
data , so the estimation take the following form:
pijk︸︷︷︸
Relative retail price
= αi wjk︸︷︷︸
Wage
+ θijk︸︷︷︸
Relative prices controlled for wages
(2.4)
according to the model above, the residual term θijk from the regression takes the
form of −ajk + (1 − αi)qijk, which is the combination of the relative total-factor-
productivities and the relative traded-input prices. The GMR estimator provides
the consistent estimation of value αi and the residual. To be precise, the wage in
the model is assumed to be orthogonal to the trade-input prices and total-factor-
productivities. Therefore, the effects of ajk on relative retail prices are not correlated
with the effects of wage wjk on relative retail prices.
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In the second stage of the estimation, we use the relative prices controlled for
wages to estimate the following:
θijk︸︷︷︸
Relative prices controlled for wages
= −ajk︸︷︷︸
Goods and source location fixed effects
+ (1− αi) qijk︸︷︷︸
Relative traded−input prices
where the fixed effects (total-factor-productivities) are also orthogonal to the relative
trade-input prices. The last part of this equation (relative trade-input prices qijk))
is the residuals term. After calculating the fitted value of the estimation, we obtain
the residuals term (1 − αi)qijk as the value calculated and combine with the value
of αi obtained from stage one, and we can finally identify the relative traded-input
prices term qijk.
2.2.2 Trade Costs Approximation
After we obtain the relative trade-input prices qijk, they are subject to the arbi-
trage condition for trade costs. We follow the strategy in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
to approximate trade costs by using traded-input prices. To elaborate, the maxi-
mum traded-input price difference across goods between two locations bounds the
trade costs.
Specifically, we observe the traded-input prices of good i across different loca-
tions. Since we do not know which location it is that the particular price is provided,
We assume that the traded-input price of good i from location j relative to location
k needs to satisfy the following:
Qij
Qik
≤ τkj (2.5)
where τkj stand for the trade costs from location k to location j. That is to say, the
relative traded-input price of good i must be less than or equal to the trade/arbitrage
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costs τkj from location k to location j. This inequality must hold. Otherwise, the
case would be Qij > τkjQik, in which situation, a producer in location j could
import this trade-input for good i at a lower price from location j, since the trade
costs would not make up the price difference. Therefore, the inequality in equation
(2.5) places a lower bound on the trade friction. We can rewrite the inequality in
log term as follows:
qijk = qij − qik ≤ logτkj (2.6)
This inequality will hold all the time as long as trade costs exist. Because the
arbitrage can happen from any location to another location, and trade costs can
be distinguished from different directions too, this bilateral inequality also holds for
the potential arbitrage from location i to location k, as follows:
qikj = qik − qij ≤ logτjk (2.7)
Since the trade costs are symmetric in the model, that is, τkj = τjk, the last two
arbitrage conditions can be combined as follows:
|qij − qik| ≤ logτjk (2.8)
We can see this bound is possible from both directions.
Improvements on this bound are possible if we observe a relatively large sample
of L goods across locations. This follows by noting that the maximum relative price
must satisfy the same inequality:
logτjk = max
i∈L
{|qij − qik|} (2.9)
notice the inequality becomes an equality when it is at the upper bound. This is
the measurement that we use as trade costs in this paper. Here, τjk stands for the
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approximated value of trade costs, and L indicates the sample size of the trade-input
prices.
As for the importance of defining trade costs, it is crucial to understand the dif-
ference in the trade costs in this paper from that in the literature. Our trade costs
cover a wider range of costs than those studies using observable data, such as trans-
portation costs, international boarder related costs, duties/tariffs etc. On the other
hand, comparing it with the studies using a similar method to approximate trade
costs, such as in Simonovska and Waugh (2014), their trade costs have a boarder
definition due to the presence of local distribution/retail costs. Our trade costs
cover all trade barriers incurred when crossing the border, such as transportation
costs and policy related costs, excluding the local distribution/retail costs. Since
our interest is to examine the after treatment of an RTA, CU and other gravity
variables on international trade barriers, we prefer to use this definition of trade
costs in the analysis.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
In the previous section, we obtained the trade costs through trade-input prices
and arbitrage condition. The next step is to investigate the effect of RTA on trade
costs. The gravity model and gravity equation are introduced first by Tinbergen
(1962), and it is used prominently in international trade studies. Interestingly,
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) address the concerns that how gravity variables ap-
proximate trade costs lack a theoretical foundation, despite the development of the
gravity model itself. Most empirical studies use bilateral gravity variables, such as
distance between locations, whether they share a common border and many other
bilateral variables. Accordingly, we consider the following regression, as our main
20
interest is to investigate the effect of RTAs on trade costs between city i and city j:
logτijt = β0 + β1 rtaijt + β2 RTAijt + β3 log dij + β4 bij +
∑
k
β5+k x
k
ijt + εijt (2.10)
where our dependent variable is the log term of the trade costs between two interna-
tional locations i and j (we can obtain it by using the methodology in the previous
section), rtaijt is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the countries where two
international cities i and k belong to are involved in any regional trade agreement.
Notice that this dummy variable is time-related, since the panel data with time in-
formation4 are given. RTAijt is a time-related variable that reflects the years of the
RTA being formed, which is related to the previous rtaijt dummy variable
5. dij is
the great circle distance in miles between city i and city j, which is time irrelevant.
bij is also a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when there is an international
border between city i and city j; notice that it is also time-irrelevant. Finally, the
vector xkijt represents a set of other control variables which potentially can determine
the trade costs, including the Currency Union (CU) dummy variable, time-related
CU variable, and bilateral gravity variables, such as common language, colonial ties,
colonial ties, etc.
One might be concerned about the problems with the equation above. The first
obvious problem is the multilateral resistant terms. It is common to include both
national incomes and price levels of source country and destination country in the
4The statue of two countries regarding RTA can change at any time available. For
example, assume two international cities i and j that coming from two countries that were
not involved in any RTA before 2013, but these two countries form an RTA in 2013. The
value of the dummy variable rtaij 2012 and all beyond year 2012 should be 0, and starting
from year 2013, the dummy for rtaijt should take the value 1.
5This time-related RTA variable takes value that is greater and equal to 0. For
example, when two countries the international cities i and j belong to just form an RTA
in year 2013, the time-related RTA variable RTAij 2013 takes the value of 0, and a year after
that in 2014, the time-related RTA variable RTAij 2014 takes the value of 1. In summary,
the value of RTAijt reflects the years an RTA has been formed or went through.
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estimation, as follows:
logτijt = β0 + β1 log Yit + β2 log Yjt + β3 rtaijt + β4 RTAijt + β5 log dij
+ β6 bij +
∑
k
β6+k x
k
ijt − log P 1−σit − log P 1−σjt + εijt
(2.11)
where the main differences are the added log terms of incomes and price indexes in
city i and city j. All of these added variables controlling for multilateral resistant
terms are time-varying. Consequently, the estimation results from equation (2.10)
suffer from omitted variable bias due to the lack of time-varying terms. At the
same time, since these city-specific income and price data are impossible to observe,
we will instead use the city-time fixed effects to capture the time-varying and city
specific characters. Therefore, we can rewrite the equation (2.11) as follows:
logτijt = β0 +β1 rtaijt+β2 RTAijt+β3 log dij +β4 bij +
∑
k
β4+k x
k
ijt+αit+αjt+εijt
(2.12)
where αit stands for city-time fixed effects of city i, and αjt stands for city-time fixed
effects of city j. Therefore, all the city-time specific characteristics can by captured
at same time such as city incomes, price indexes, etc.
Santos Silva and Tenreyo (2006) point out several concerns when we estimate the
equations above by ordinary least squares (OLS). They mention three major issues,
the first of which is the heteroskedasticity problem. The error term is biased and
correlated with the explanatory variables in the estimation. The second issue is that
it cannot address the value of zero. Since the natural log term of zero is undefined,
the city pairs with zero trade costs in between them in special cases have to be
dropped or ignored. The third issue involves the concern of the exogeneity of the
dependent and independent variables. They suggest that a Poisson quasi-maximum
likelihood estimator of the gravity model provides consistent estimates of the
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parameters even with heteroskedasticity errors and solves all the issues mentioned
above.
As a robustness check for the after-treatment effects of RTA, the biggest concern
is the endogeneity problem following equations (2.10) or (2.12). Particularly, we
need to address the omitted variables issue, since there is no way to list all the
factors that could potentially affect trade costs. Another issue with the regressions
so far is the correlation of independent variables. For example, we are interested
in the after-treatment effects of RTAs on trade costs, so suppose that a city pair
belongs to countries that share the same common language. Of course, intuitively,
this strong cultural tie would lead to smaller trade costs between the city pair,
and at the same time, it would be more likely for their countries to form an RTA.
Therefore, the error term of the estimation is correlated with the RTAs and the
common language dummy variable, and the coefficients estimated are biased.
We want to find a method to solve the issue mentioned above that captures all
the time-irrelevant unobserved city-pair characteristics that would affect the trade
costs, and this term should also not be correlated with the RTA variable that we
mainly focus on. The bilateral-pair (city-pair) fixed effects seems to solve the issue;
this added term would capture all the time-irrelevant city-pair-specific factors, such
as all the bilateral gravity variables. Thus, we can rewrite equations (2.10) and
(2.12) as follows:
logτijt = β0+β1 rtaijt+β2 RTAijt+
∑
k
β2+k x
k
ijt+ αit + αjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Multilateral Resistant Terms
+αij+εijt
(2.13)
where αij stands for this bilateral pair fixed effects. Since this term captures all
the time-irrelevant country pair features, all the city (country) pair -specific dummy
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variables, such as distance, common border, etc., are omitted. The vector xkijt con-
tains only the CU dummy variable and the time-related CU variables. They are
both time-varying and are not omitted due to the fact that they still capture the
time-sensitive characteristics that affect the trade costs.
There are many other ways to solve this endogeneity issue. To summarize, Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) point out the modern solutions to address the endogeneity is-
sue when we estimate the gravity model are to take advantage of the panel approach
instead of cross-sectional data analysis, where studies use traditional methods. The
instrumental-variable techniques and control-function techniques do not adjust for
the endogeneity issue well, and they are subject to changes in data selection and
sample sizes.
As mentioned, the bilateral city fixed effects should capture all the time-irrelevant
unobserved bilateral pair characteristics. Many studies also use the first-differencing
method. Wooldridge (2002) concludes that when the time periods in the panel data
that are available exceeds two, the fixed-effects estimator is more efficient than the
first-differencing estimator under the assumption that the error terms are serially
uncorrelated. If the assumption changes the error term of the first-differenced esti-
mation following a random walk, the first-differencing estimator is going to be more
efficient. We consider the time-differencing estimator as our further robustness check
considering the potential endogeneity issue. Therefore, we estimate as follows:
4logτij,t−(t−1) = β0 + β14 rtaij,t−(t−1) + β24RTAij,t−(t−1)
+ αit + αjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Multilateral Resistant Terms
+νij,t−(t−1)
(2.14)
where νij,t−(t−1) = εijt− εij,t−1 is white noise. Since this is a replacement of bilateral
fixed effects approach, we do not have the bilateral fixed effects term αij in equation
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(2.13). We consider both the scenarios with or without the multilateral resistant
terms (αit + αjt).
2.4 Data
As mentioned in the previous sections, to obtain trade costs through the arbitrage
condition, we need to have micro-level data available. Our price data come from
Numbeo6, which is the world’s largest database for user contributed data about
cities all around the world. Numbeo provides current and timely information on
world living conditions, including cost of living, housing indicators, healthcare, traf-
fic, crime and pollution. It allows for users to access the price database among its
large city list. For the concern regarding the accuracy of the data, Numbeo uses
several methodologies to counteract the drawbacks of the user self-contributed infor-
mation. The first step is to check, pick up and drop the outliers among those data
provided from online users. Second, one-quarter of the lowest and highest inputs
are discarded as borderline cases. Finally, Numbeo uses heuristic technology that
discards data that are most likely statistically incorrect.
The micro-price data set extracted from Numbeo includes 49 retail goods and
their retail prices. We drop all the non-traded local goods due to the fact that local
distribution costs are not considered in the scope of international arbitrage, and the
prices of non-traded goods are not subject to arbitrage according to our trade costs
specification. Therefore, in the calculation of trade cots, overall, we have 22 traded
goods that are available to provide prices at the retail level. All the trade goods
come from 512 cities (covering 56 countries) for the years between 2010 and 2016
6Numbeo has their customer interface through link: http://www.numbeo.com/
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7. The 22 traded good prices are all available for 478 cities, so we pair every city
with all other cities that have all the price data available in that particular year.
Doing so results in the generation of 215,134 observations, overall, for city pairs
that have price data available for all year spans. In all the city pairs, the number of
international city pairs is 2,230 (116 city pairs are intranational pairs in which both
cities are from the same country). Since all city pairs have data available for all the
years from 2010 to 2016, this data set we created is balanced.
We use the model-implied traded input prices that were acquired from traded
good prices data and wage data. Since the price data and wage data are all year-
specific, we can get the short-run trade costs for city pairs in the year when price
data are available. On average, the trade costs in between all the city pairs are
approximately 1.39, while the trade costs between international city pairs are 1.44,
on average, and 0.74 for intranational city pairs. These measurements of trade costs
are significantly smaller compared to the literature. The well-defined ad-valorem
equivalent (ice-berg) trade costs in Eaton and Kortum (2002) are approximately
1.90, and they are approximately 1.70 in Anderson and Wincoop (2004). As men-
tioned above, the definition of our trade costs is slightly different from the literature.
First, the trade costs we obtained are at the city level instead of the country level,
as most of the studies use. Second, the trade costs in the literature do not control
for retail/local distribution costs, but to serve the purpose of our interests, they are
calculated without considering the retail costs.
Other gravity variables are collected during the same time from Reuven and
Rose (2016). For the bilateral-specific gravity variables, we exploit the World Fact-
book from the CIA for a number of country-specific variables, such as island status,
language, and colonizers. We create the dummy variables, such as ”border”, which
7See the complete goods list in Table section below.
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indicate whether two countries have an international border; ”colony”, which deter-
mines whether two countries were ever in a colonial relationship; ”comlang”, which
shows whether two countries share the same common language; and ”island”, which
is a three way dummy variable that takes the values of 0/1/2, which indicates if
either (neither or both) country in the pair is (are) an island country (countries).
However, these bilateral variables are all at the country level, and our trade costs
are at the city level. Since the international trade from international cities does not
account for local distribution costs, all the effects of these country-level bilateral
gravity variables capture these effects on trade costs. Finally, we obtain distances
in the measurement of miles between city pairs through the latitude and longitude
acquired through the Google Map API.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Benchmark Case
The benchmark regressions using OLS and the random effects estimator are
given in Table 2.1. Column 1 uses only binary dummy variables for regional trade
agreements and currency unions to explain trade costs. When two nations have an
RTA, the trade costs between two cities in each country decreased by 27.6%. When
we include all the control variables to avoid any omitted variable bias, as shown in
column 4, the existence of an RTA between two countries reduces the trade costs
between two cities from those two countries by 12.3%. This result is smaller com-
pared to 23% in D. Yilmazkuday and H. Yilmazkuday (2016), who include an RTA
dummy in their random effects regression of the trade costs on direct fly between
cities. However, their study focuses on the analysis of long-run effects by calculating
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the average trade costs through the entire time period. It smooths out the volatility
and hides the details that come from our trade costs calculated on yearly bases.
Accordingly, the trade costs used in our study are time-related, which means that
the trade costs calculated in our study give a unique number every year, instead
of taking the mean of all the values across the whole year span. Currency union
also affects trade costs negatively and significantly. Specifically, according to the
estimation in column 1, when two countries are in a currency union, the trade costs
between two cities in each country will decrease on average by 33% compared with
other cities, and after adding other control variables, according to column 4, the
effect of having a currency union dropped the trade costs from 33% to 52.9%.
After adding the time-related RTA and currency union variables to the binary
dummies without other control variables, as the case shown in column 3, the exis-
tence of an RTA reduces the trade costs by 12.3% immediately, and the phased-in
effect reduces the trade costs by 1.29% each year after the RTA is introduced. On
the other hand, even though the currency union has a significant and negative effect
on trade costs instantly, it has the phased-out effect to cause the trade costs to in-
crease 2.48% each year after two countries join a currency union. This finding means
that even though a currency union causes a decrease in the trade costs between two
cities, it will offset the effect by causing the trade costs to rise to the original level in
approximately 15 years. Similarly, for the RTA, the initial impact and phased-in ef-
fect on trade costs diminished when all the control variables are included. In column
6, it shows that the RTA has a negative impact on trade costs immediately after the
forming of the RTA (coefficient of -12.3%), and the phased-in effect is 0.815% each
year after the initial impact of the RTA. Currency union, on the other hand, causes
the trade costs to decrease by 52.9% immediately but increase by approximately 3%
each year after. The phased-out effect of the currency union is still prominent.
28
In addition to RTAs and currency union, having a common border between the
countries where two cities are located also has a negative influence on trade costs.
Specifically, a common border reduces the trade costs by 49.3%. A colonial relation-
ship between two countries reduces the trade costs of city pairs by approximately
34.6%. However, if the city pairs are in countries that share a common language,
the trade costs increase by 8.78%. This result contradicts our prediction. If there
is only one city in a city pair categorized as an island country, the trade costs are
reduced by 7.5%. As the dummy variable for landlocked and island indicators takes
3 values (0/1/2), the case of both cities belong to two island countries will reduce the
trade costs by almost 15%. Finally, the effect of distance on trade costs is negative
but insignificant, according to column 6, where we include all the control variables.
However, in the model in column 5 without RTA and currency union dummies, the
distance affects trade costs positively and significantly. This result causes concern
regarding the nonlinearity of distance effects, which we will also discuss more in the
following subsection.
2.5.2 Robustness Checks
Nonlinearity in Distance Measures
Up to this point, we have evaluated the distance effects using the log term of the
distances between cities. Now, we consider nonlinearities in the effects of distance on
trade costs. The results are given in Table 2.2. For all the estimations, we include the
four most important variables we are focusing on (RTA dummy, CU dummy, time-
related RTA variable and time-related CU variable) and all other time-irrelevant
control variables. Column 1 replicates column 6 in Table 2.1, with consideration of
all the control variables and the random estimator. The second column considers
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an extra log distance squared variable. The third column includes five distance-
interval dummy variables in the replacement of the log distance variable in the first
column. Each distance interval represents a 20 percentile of the distance between
cities, compared to all the distances in the data.8 As the results show, in column 2,
the coefficient of the log distance square is negative and significant. The coefficient of
the log distance is positive and significant. This indicates the potential nonlinearity
in the distance effect on trade costs. Column 4 also supports this assumption by
presenting different and significant coefficients of different distance interval dummies.
Therefore, this provides evidence for nonlinearity in distance effects on trade costs.
We can also observe that the treatment effects of the RTA dummy and time-related
variable are both negative and significant in random-effect estimators. From column
4 to column 6, we consider the nonlinearity of distance effects with city fixed effects.
Column 4 shows that a longer distance between two cities causes higher trade costs.
Column 5 yields similar results compared with column 2. Specifically, the coefficient
of the log distance square is negative and significant. The coefficients of all distance
intervals in column 6 are significant and different from each other. Therefore, we
can conclude that there is strong evidence of nonlinearity in the effect of distance
on trade costs. For the RTA effects on trade costs, which we mainly focus on, we
still observe a negative and significant immediate impact and phased-in effect.
Endogeneity of RTA and CU
In the early gravity studies, the drawback of the cross-sectional data is not
able to explain the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity or provide estimations
of enough treatment effects to solve the endogeneity problem. In our study, this
8A city pair’s distance can only allocated in one of the five distance intervals, and the
dummy for that interval has the value equals 1
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concern is the multilateral resistant term in the gravity model. Ghosh and Yamarik
(2004) address the issue of the insignificance of the effects of RTAs on either trade
or trade costs by using cross-sectional data and extreme-bounds analysis to test the
robustness of the RTA dummy coefficients. The results show that the effects of most
RTAs on trade are not reliable. Instead, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest using
the panel approach combined with fixed effects. We combine city and time fixed
effects in our analysis to eliminate the unobserved city-time-related heterogeneity.
In addition to the unobserved city-time related heterogeneity, there are more
concerns regarding the endogeneity bias in estimating the treatment effects on the
RTA dummy. Since the RTA dummy is possibly correlated with the unobserved
variables and even potentially has the causality problem with trade costs (LHS
variable), the literature has begun using the panel approach to solve the issue. The
earliest literature, such as Magee (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2002), uses
IV or control-function techniques to solve the issue. Later, Baier and Bergstrand
(2004) demonstrate the after-treatment effects of the gravity model using IV, or
control-function techniques are unstable and lead to fragile conclusions. Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) take a step forward to include bilateral fixed effects (country-pair
fixed effects) and the first difference method to eliminate the endogeneity problem
of the RTA dummy. This requires balanced panel data with all the years’ data
available for the city pairs.9 Thereafter, we also include city-pair fixed effects in our
estimations.
First, we only include bilateral fixed effects (city-pair fixed effects) to the random
effects estimator without considering the multilateral resistant terms in Table 2.3.
9Next step is for us to analyze RTA effects with the alternative way beside of fixed
effects estimators, such as using first difference, city-pair fixed effects, and considering
time lag effects of RTA dummy.
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Due to the fact that there are unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, we can not
capture in the regression besides the distance, border, common language, colonial
ties, etc., bilateral fixed effects is used in literature, such as Cheng and Wall (2005),
Tomz, Goldenstein and Rivers (2007), and Magee (2008). They all conduct similar
studies using panel data to estimate the effects of RTA on trade flow. Column
1 to column 3 use the OLS estimator. The results are consistent with the after
treatment effects on CU dummy, time-related RTA and CU variables. Accordingly,
after considering the city-pair fixed effects, having an RTA causes city pairs to have
an overall 120% decrease in trade costs compared to the city pairs belong to countries
without an RTA at the point when the RTA forms. Every year after that, the RTA
reduce trad costs by approximately 34%. These results are amplified compared with
the analysis in Table 1. However, it is still aligned with the finding in literature. For
example, Magee (2008) confirms that the cumulative RTA effect on trade is 1.01,
which means having an RTA dubble the trade volume between two countries. On
the other hand, the after treatment effect on CU dummy remains negative on trade
costs, a 128% drop of the trade costs on average if city pairs belong to countries that
join in a CU. The effect of the time-related CU variable is small and insignificant.
From column 4 to column 6, we introduce the PQML estimator with city-pair
fixed effects as comparison. The results turn out to be consistent with the OLS
estimator. However, the magnitude of the immediate impact and phased-in effect
are smaller. For the after-treatment effect of the RTA, city pairs belonging to
countries in an RTA have 41.3% less trade costs, on average, by the time the RTA
is introduced, and every year after that, the RTA will reduce the trade costs by
12.1%. Similarly, there are significant after-treatment effects of CUs. City pairs
belong to countries in a currency union have 26% less trade costs than those city
pairs that do not belong to a currency union by the time the CU is introduced.
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However, there is no significant effect of currency unions on trade costs every year
thereafter. Regarding the sensitivity of the RTA after treatment effects, we can see
minor differences when we switch the estimator from OLS to PQML. The signs for
the two dummy variables and the two time-related variables remain the same. The
coefficients are considerably smaller in the PQML estimator compared with the OLS
estimator.
Table 2.4 investigates the bilateral fixed effects in the case of considering the
multilateral resistant terms. Therefore, the entire estimation includes city-time fixed
effects (the multilateral resistant terms) and city-pair fixed effects (bilateral fixed
effect). Similarly, the first three columns present the OLS estimator and columns 4
to 6 preset the results using the PQML estimator. Comparing the OLS and PQML
horizontally, the signs in front of the significant coefficients do not change, and the
values are consistent with minor differences, which again examine the insensitivity
of the after treatment effects of the RTA and CU in regard to OLS and PQML.
Comparing Table 2.4 with Table 2.3, we still see consistency regarding the signs and
values of the coefficients. For CU, considering the multilateral resistant terms (city-
time fixed effects) in Table 2.4, the initial impact of CUs on trade costs decreases
from -127.7% to -103.8% in OLS and from -26% to insignificant in PQML; the time-
related CU variable does not have a significant effect on trade costs for both cases.
Large changes come from the after-treatment effects on RTA, considering that the
multilateral resistant terms push down the initial impact of the RTA on trade costs
from -120% to -54.3% with OLS and -41.3% to -20.6% with PQML. It also decreases
the after-treatment effects of the time-related RTA variable on trade costs from -
34% to -5.5% in OLS and -12.1% to -2.59% in PQML.
Table 2.5 provides another method to address the endogeneity issue. We expect
the first-differencing method to more accurately describe the after treatment effects
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of the RTA and CU or at least to evaluate the robustness of the bilateral pair
fixed effects estimator, since both are aimed to solve the issue of potential omitted
variables bias created by time-irrelevant city-pair specific barriers. We also consider
the multilateral resistant terms (time-related multilateral price terms) by using city-
time fixed effects. Columns 1, 4 and 7 investigate the concurrent changes in RTAs
and CUs with only the first-differencing of the RTA and CU dummy variables and
the time-related variables. As a comparison to Table 2.4, in columns 1 to 3 with
the OLS estimator, the first-differencing method should be consistent with using the
bilateral fixed effects. The after-treatment effects of the RTA and CU maintain the
same signs as the RTA dummy, which has a positive effect on trade costs, while the
CU dummy has a negative effect. Changing from not being in an RTA to joining
in an RTA, on average, increases the change of trade costs by 8.59%. Because
the first-differencing allows for all other constant time-irrelevant factors to remove
the impact themselves, the 8.59% increase in trade costs is due to the joining in an
RTA. For the bilateral fixed effects method, the after-treatment effects of an RTA are
11.3%. The results are also consistent when comparing the after-treatment effects
of a CU and the first-differencing method. An 18.3% decrease of trade costs, on
average, is due to the formation of a CU with the first-differencing method, and the
after-treatment effect is 14% in regard to using the bilateral fixed effects method.
For the first-differenced time-related variables, the coefficients of both RTA and CU
are insignificant compared to the bilateral fixed effects method, where we have a
time-related RTA variable that is significant but small. In columns 2, 5 and 8, we
include an extra second-differencing lag term for both the RTA and CU dummies
and time-related variables. The purpose of using second-differencing is to examine
the phased-in (time) effect along with our time-related variables. In this sense, in
the model of column 8, the second-differencing of the RTA and CU dummies should
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have the mirror effects of the first-differencing time-related RTA and CU variables.
We can observe the mirror effects from columns 2 and 5, where the coefficient in front
of the second-differenced RTA dummy is 0.037, and the coefficient in front of the
first-differenced RTA time-related variable is -0.040. They are both significant, and
the difference between them is negligible. Then, regarding CUs, the coefficient in
front of the second-differenced CU dummy and the first-differenced CU time-related
variable are also similar to each other with the values of 0.0725 and 0.0752, even
though one of them is insignificant. The other evidence comes from column 8. The
second-differenced CU dummy and the second-differenced time-related RTA variable
are omitted in this model due to the collinearity problem, which means that these
two variables can be linearly explained by the other two variables in the model (the
first-differenced time-related CU variable and the first-differenced RTA dummy).
We also include the future-change terms for both the RTA and CU dummies and
the time-related variables in columns 3, 6 and 9. This method is used to detect the
exogeneity of the explaining variable to the independent variable. As we can see,
due to the insignificant coefficients in front of all the CU future change terms, the
future change in the status of CU has no significant effect on trade costs, which
indicates that trade costs are not the reason for the future change in the status of
CUs. On the other hand, the future change of the RTA dummy and time-related
RTA variable all have significant impacts on the change of trade costs. Recall the
results from Table 4 with the bilateral fixed effects and the case considering the
multilateral resistant terms, having an RTA means that, on average, city pairs have
larger trade costs between them, and the phased-in effect has a negative impact
on trade costs after joining in the RTA throughout the years. This high level of
trade costs might be the reason to form the RTA. Again, due to the collinearity
issue, both the first-differenced and the second-differenced RTA and CU dummies
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are all omitted from the estimation. Only the first-differenced time-related RTA has
a significant impact on trade costs after adding the future change terms.
Finally, as a further robustness check for the phased-in effect of the time-related
variables in Table 2.6, we estimate the lag terms of the RTA and CU dummies as
the replacement of the time-related RTA and CU variables. We test the lag form of
one period to five periods and one future period in the end. Considering the case
with both bilateral fixed effects and the multilateral resistant terms, we revisit the
case in which only concurrent RTA and CU dummies are considered. On average,
there are more trade costs between city pairs that belong to countries that have an
RTA, and there are less trade costs in regard to CUs. Since there are examples in
the EEC agreement of 1958 or NAFTA, they were all examined in the literature
to have phased-in effects in which the after-treatment effect typically affects trade
costs over the time span of approximately 10 years. Therefore, we included five-year
lags as a replacement for the time-related RTA and CU variables and a future term
to address the strict exogeneity problem. We notice that the lag terms for both
RTA and CU are not stable and possibly have nonlinearity issues. The lag 1 terms
of RTA in different models all have negative coefficients as expected. Within those,
only the model including 1 lag term variable is significant. When we look at the lag
2 terms for all RTA variables, they show a significant positive impact on trade costs,
as a sign for nonlinearity. Lag 3 terms only have one positive significant estimation.
Lag 4 terms have one negative significant estimation. Lag 5 terms and future terms
are all insignificant. It is similar in regard to CUs. Most lag terms are insignificant
or omitted due to the collinearity problem. This result of CUs is consistent with
the results shown in Table 8 with the time-related variable, in which the phased-in
effects of CU are unclear. In the end, the insignificant future terms of both RTA and
CU suggest the exogeneity of these two variables against the independent variable
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(trade costs) because it shows the future terms of RTA and CU are uncorrelated
with the trade costs with the coefficient in front of the future terms of RTA and CU
being -0.007 and 0.03, small and insignificantly different from zero.
2.6 Conclusion
There are multiple complications in regard to examining the effects of regional
trade agreements on trade costs. The complications come from determining the
appropriate methodology for measuring the trade costs to forming the empirical
estimations with different estimators for robustness. There are no direct observable
trade costs that are available that cover not only direct costs, such as transportation
costs and duties/tariffs, but also indirect costs, such as information barriers and time
costs. It is difficult to establish the argument regarding RTA effects where RTAs and
trade costs can possibly affect each other in both directions. The impact of RTAs
on trade costs can vary across different sample selections and in different RTAs; the
after-treatment effects of an RTA can be effective throughout time rather than be-
ing immediate. The trade costs in this paper accurately portray the requirement for
describing international trade impediments, excluding the local distribution costs.
The estimations in this paper utilize different methodologies to account for differ-
ent considerations, including multilateral resistant terms, time-irrelevant bilateral
characteristics and time-related effects on trade costs.
As shown in the previous section, the after-treatment effects of RTAs on trade
costs are sensitive to many factors. Overall, the effects of RTAs on trade costs tend
to be negative, which means having an RTA will decrease trade costs on average.
The results are consistent in the benchmark analysis and with multiple robustness
checks considering the city-time fixed effects estimator (multilateral resistant terms)
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and city-pair fixed effects (time-irrelevant bilateral characteristics). When we add
more related gravity variables into the estimations, the negative impacts of RTAs
remain significant. Moreover, the effects of the standard gravity variables on trade
costs are consistent with the literature.
The estimations also reveal more interesting results when we included a time-
related RTA variable. Specifically, in both the benchmark analysis and the robust-
ness checks, this new added variable has a negative impact on trade costs, which
means that the trade costs keep decreasing throughout time after the RTAs has
been introduced. These phased-in effects of RTAs have been caught in all random
and fixed effects estimators, which confirms the results found in the literature, such
as Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Magee (2003), that RTAs will continue to effect
trade for almost a decade after the trade deal begins. Finally, the results indicate
that it is still a puzzle as to how we can explain the causality of forming RTAs and
trade costs reduction. The study shows mixed results regarding the exogeneity of
the RTA dummy variable. With positive effects on trade costs when forming an
RTA one period in the future, this study suggests that relatively higher trade costs
could be related to the forming of an RTA. There are numerous questions in this
area that need answers, and it is interesting to see more disaggregate analysis re-
garding different specific RTAs and what caused these phased-in effects for different
RTAs.
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Table 2.1: Benchmark Estimation Results for Trade Costs
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTA -0.276∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.00907) (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.0128)
CU -0.330∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0669) (0.0356) (0.0657)
Time-related RTA -0.0177∗∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗ -0.00815∗∗∗
(0.000513) (0.000693) (0.000636) (0.000737)
Time-related CU -0.0115∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗∗
(0.00363) (0.00665) (0.00356) (0.00651)
Common Border -0.545∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0213) (0.0213)
Common Colony -0.336∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗
(0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0265)
Common Language 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0817∗∗∗ 0.0878∗∗∗
(0.00914) (0.00917) (0.00914)
Island -0.0761∗∗∗ -0.0916∗∗∗ -0.0750∗∗∗
(0.00985) (0.00971) (0.00981)
Log Distance 0.00986 0.0237∗∗∗ -0.00625
(0.00681) (0.00649) (0.00694)
cons 1.411∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 1.411∗∗∗ 1.332∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 1.468∗∗∗
(0.00463) (0.00426) (0.00458) (0.0581) (0.0547) (0.0592)
Sample Sizes 15610 15610 15610 15610 15610 15610
R-squared 0.069 0.079 0.089 0.124 0.121 0.131
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.079 0.089 0.123 0.121 0.130
F-value 576.1 672.3 380.9 314.4 307.8 261.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of trade costs. The estimation method is OLS.
All models use random fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.2: Estimation Results for Trade Costs: Nonlinearities in Distance Measures
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTA -0.123∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.0465∗∗∗ -0.0495∗∗∗ -0.0373∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0118)
CU -0.529∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗ -0.116∗ -0.122∗ -0.112∗
(0.0657) (0.0656) (0.0658) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0542)
Time-related RTA -0.00815∗∗∗ -0.00787∗∗∗ -0.00873∗∗∗ -0.00835∗∗∗ -0.00810∗∗∗ -0.00885∗∗∗
(0.000737) (0.000737) (0.000733) (0.000650) (0.000652) (0.000645)
Time-related CU 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.0108∗ 0.0116∗ 0.0120∗
(0.00651) (0.00650) (0.00651) (0.00535) (0.00535) (0.00530)
Common Border -0.493∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0191)
Common Colony -0.346∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0267) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0286)
Common Language 0.0878∗∗∗ 0.0880∗∗∗ 0.0970∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.00914) (0.00913) (0.00914) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0127)
Island -0.0750∗∗∗ -0.0606∗∗∗ -0.0614∗∗∗ -0.467∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗
(0.00981) (0.0100) (0.00983) (0.0671) (0.0670) (0.0665)
Log Distance -0.00625 0.487∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(0.00694) (0.0725) (0.00727) (0.0621)
Log Distance Squared -0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0175∗∗∗
(0.00463) (0.00395)
Log Distance Interval #1 0.0978∗∗∗ 0.0887∗∗∗
(0.0164) (0.0153)
Log Distance Interval #2 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0116)
Log Distance Interval #3 0.0151 0.153∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0109)
Log Distance Interval #4 0.0119 0.160∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0108)
Log Distance Interval #5 0 0
(.) (.)
cons 1.468∗∗∗ -0.428 1.386∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗∗ 0.102 1.208∗∗∗
(0.0592) (0.284) (0.0106) (0.153) (0.281) (0.142)
City Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 15610 15610 15610 15610 15610 15610
R-squared 0.131 0.134 0.133 0.463 0.463 0.474
Adjusted R-squared 0.130 0.133 0.133 0.458 0.459 0.469
F-value 261.1 240.4 200.2 93.84 93.43 96.24
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of trade costs. The estimation method is OLS. log
Distance Intervals refer to the first to fifth 20th percentile of the log distance measures. Standard errors,
clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results for Trade Costs: City-pair Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs
OLS OLS OLS PQML PQML PQML
RTA -1.748∗∗∗ -1.198∗∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.203) (0.0493) (0.0487)
CU -2.355∗∗∗ -1.277∗ -0.651∗∗∗ -0.260∗
(0.590) (0.594) (0.113) (0.129)
Time-related RTA -0.357∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0181) (0.00524) (0.00540)
Time-related CU 0.0665 0.0818 0.0107 0.0160
(0.0847) (0.0858) (0.0174) (0.0216)
cons 3.576∗∗∗ 4.256∗∗∗ 4.537∗∗∗
(0.0590) (0.0614) (0.0773)
City-pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 15354 15354 15354 15354 15354 15354
R-squared 0.007 0.030 0.033
Adjusted R-squared -0.162 -0.135 -0.131
F-value 44.85 204.9 112.5
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of trade costs. The estimation method in
column 1-3 is OLS. The estimation method in column 4-6 is PQML (quasi-maximum likelihood
estimation). Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2.4: Estimation Results for Trade Costs: City-time and City-pair Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs
OLS OLS OLS PQML PQML PQML
RTA -0.586∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.185) (0.0489) (0.0489)
CU -1.078∗∗ -1.038∗ -0.202 -0.144
(0.527) (0.537) (0.126) (0.130)
Time-related RTA -0.0612∗∗∗ -0.0547∗∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0259∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.00557) (0.00560)
Time-related CU 0.0598 0.0780 0.00505 0.00874
(0.0764) (0.0776) (0.0139) (0.0157)
cons 5.496∗∗∗ 5.488∗∗∗ 5.617∗∗∗
(0.0648) (0.0649) (0.0779)
City-time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Sizes 15354 15354 15354 15354 15354 15354
R-squared 0.210 0.210 0.211
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.076
F-value 436.1 435.5 349.9
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of trade costs. The estimation method in
column 1-3 is OLS. The estimation method in column 4-6 is PQML (quasi-maximum likelihood
estimation). Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results for Trade Costs: A Time-differenced Approach with City-time Fixed Effects
Log Trade Costs - First Differenced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
dRTA -0.555∗∗ -0.465∗ -0.630∗∗ -0.541+
(0.278) (0.275) (0.283) (0.279)
dCU -1.659∗∗ -0.889 -0.943 -1.652∗
(0.741) (0.932) (0.953) (0.743)
ddRTA 0.369 0.181
(0.229) (0.246)
ddCU 1.267∗∗ 2.832∗∗∗ 3.750∗∗∗ 3.750∗∗
(0.635) (0.883) (1.296) (1.296)
fRTA -0.691∗∗
(0.322)
fCU -1.166
(0.953)
dTime-related RTA 0.0413 0.400∗ 0.806∗∗ 0.0393 0.806∗∗ 0.806∗∗
(0.0602) (0.229) (0.359) (0.0605) (0.359) (0.359)
dTime-related CU 0.220 1.287∗∗ 3.750∗∗∗ 0.197
(0.235) (0.637) (1.296) (0.235)
ddTime-related RTA -0.379 -0.154 -0.154 -0.154
(0.232) (0.249) (0.249) (0.249)
ddTime-related CU -1.156∗ -2.798∗∗∗ 0.951 0.951
(0.664) (0.908) (0.981) (0.981)
fTime-related RTA -0.549+ -0.549+ -0.549+
(0.283) (0.283) (0.283)
fTime-related CU -0.958 -0.958 -0.958
(0.954) (0.954) (0.954)
cons -0.800 -1.089 -0.465 -0.839 -1.110 0.339 -0.838 0.339 0.339
(1.076) (1.007) (1.146) (1.078) (1.008) (1.148) (1.078) (1.148) (1.148)
City-time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 13070 11093 8863 13070 11093 8863 13070 8863 8863
R-squared 0.120 0.074 0.085 0.119 0.074 0.084 0.120 0.084 0.084
Adjusted R-squared 0.110 0.062 0.070 0.110 0.062 0.069 0.110 0.069 0.069
F-value 12.46 6.205 5.636 12.40 6.181 5.609 12.30 5.609 5.609
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of trade costs difference from period t to t + 1. The estimation
method is OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Phased-in Estimation Results for Trade Costs: with City-time and City-pair
Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTA -0.374∗∗∗ -0.599∗∗∗ -0.918∗∗∗ -0.888∗∗∗ -1.276∗∗ -1.089∗∗∗
(0.0435) (0.190) (0.214) (0.247) (0.558) (0.472)
CU -0.397∗∗ -0.484 -0.436 -0.424 -0.371 -0.245
(0.174) (0.536) (0.744) (0.745) (0.756) (0.640)
RTAlag1 0.220 0.155 0.242 0.274 0.335
(0.192) (0.278) (0.325) (0.611) (0.524)
CUlag1 0.309 0.925 -0.0159 -0.0159 0.211
(0.556) (0.898) (1.052) (1.067) (0.870)
RTAlag2 0.420∗ 0.303 0.864∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.283) (0.339) (0.303)
CUlag2 -0.726 3.850∗∗∗ 0.227
(0.530) (1.013) (1.029)
RTAlag3 -0.0149 -0.183 0.447
(0.190) (0.299) (0.299)
CUlag3 -3.764∗∗∗
(0.712)
RTAlag4 -0.150 -0.944∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.229)
CUlag4 -0.293 -0.694
(0.731) (0.634)
RTA forward1 -0.313
(0.554)
CU forward1 0.213
(0.640)
cons 3.175∗∗∗ 2.829∗∗∗ 2.685∗∗∗ 2.687∗∗∗ 2.749∗∗∗ 2.562∗∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0228) (0.0267) (0.0277)
City-time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 15354 13323 11150 8920 6690 4460
R-squared 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.021
Adjusted R-squared 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.019
F-value 44.76 28.62 18.81 14.43 12.40 9.711
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of trade costs. The estimation method
is OLS. Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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CHAPTER 3
GRAVITY CHANNELS IN TRADE
3.1 Introduction
Since the seminal studies of Ravenstein (1889) and Tinbergen (1962), a wide
range of studies have utilized a gravity model to explain international trade and
migration activities. The literature uses gravity variables to explain bilateral char-
acteristics between two countries, such as distance, a common language, a common
border, colonial ties, and regional trade agreements. The theoretical framework of
the gravity model builds on studies such as Anderson (1979) and Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) within the context of homogeneous firms. In recent years, studies
have focused on building a gravity model within the heterogeneous firms framework
(Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Chaney, 2008; Arkolakis et al.,2012; Arkolakis et al.,
2015). Arkolakis et al. (2010) conclude that even though theories use different
frameworks, the estimated gravity equation can be expressed in a log-linear for-
mat, where log trade enters as the dependent variable, and source and destination
country-specific effects and gravity variables explaining the trade costs enter as the
independent variables.
Specific studies also use gravity variables as a direct approach to proxy trade costs
instead of trade flows. Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Yilmazkuday (2012) introduce
gravity variables, especially distance, to explain trade costs (mainly transportation
costs). In a study regarding measuring trade costs with gravity variables, Dovy
(2011) includes a complete list of the gravity variables mentioned in the literature,
such as distance, colonial ties, common boarders, common languages, regional trade
agreements, and currency unions.
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A survey study by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) puts together the re-
sults and implications of current studies based on the effects of gravity variables
on trade. According to their investigation, the tax equivalent of international trade
costs is approximately 74 percent, including transportation costs of approximately
12 percent, language barrier costs of approximately 7 percent, and duties/tariffs
of approximately 3 percent (for the U.S.), among others, such as information or
security barriers.
The economic models in these surveys imply that gravity variables explain trade
volume through trade costs, mostly corresponding to the difference between source
and destination prices. Home bias or the preferences of consumers can affect trade
volume, too. However, the standard assumption for the demand-side preferences
in the structural models are homogeneous. Anderson (2011), Anderson and Van
Wincoop (2004) both mention this problem, suggesting that these gravity variables
may also capture the consumer preferences in the destination country. In particular,
as Anderson (2011) writes,
”In practice it is very difficult to distinguish demand-side home bias
from the effect of trade costs, since the proxies used in the literature
(common language, former colonial ties, or internal trade dummies, etc.)
plausibly pick up both demand and cost differences. Henceforth trade
cost is used without qualification but is understood to potentially reflect
demand-side home bias.”
Anderson (2011) mainly emphasizes the difficulty of distinguishing between the ef-
fects of preferences and trade costs on international trade when gravity variables
are employed in the gravity model.
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In recent studies, gravity variables are mainly used as proxies for both direct and
indirect trade costs. The former costs refer to measurable costs, such as transporta-
tion costs and duties/tariffs. The latter costs correspond to abstract/dark costs
such as information barriers, language barriers, and search costs. Although the ex-
isting literature has used these gravity variables extensively, there are insufficient
attempts to decompose the overall gravity effects on trade (across time and space)
through the channels of direct and indirect trade costs. This is mostly due to data
limitations concerning trade costs, especially indirect ones.
By constructing a simple demand-side model, we differentiate the effects of grav-
ity variables on preferences and trade costs. Including both duties/tariffs and trans-
portation costs while excluding local distribution costs, the trade costs of U.S. im-
ports are defined as the difference between source and destination prices. Having
data about trade costs directly allows us to calculate the effects of gravity variables
on the measured data that we have.
To demonstrate the contribution of this paper in a clear manner, we consider
two types of preferences. The first type of preferences is assigned to be random
(we call it the case of ”random preferences”), which is mostly the case in the liter-
ature, as we show in detail below. Based on these random preferences, the model
implies that gravity variables only capture the effects of measured trade costs (i.e.,
duties/tariffs and transportation costs), as in a typical gravity regression. A post-
estimation decomposition further shows that approximately one third of the effects
on international trade (of gravity variables) are through the channel of duties/tariffs,
whereas the rest are through the channel of transportation costs.
Another type of preferences that we consider depends on gravity variables (we
call it the case of ”dyadic preferences”), which correspond to the quote by An-
derson (2011) above. Based on dyadic preferences, the model implies that gravity
50
variables not only capture the effects of measured trade costs (duties/tariffs and
transportation costs) but also those of preferences in a typical gravity regression. A
post-estimation decomposition further shows that virtually all the effects of grav-
ity variables on U.S. imports are due to preferences, whereas the effects through
duties/tariffs and transportation costs are very small. Therefore, it is essential to
consider the effects of gravity variables on preferences.
When considering the specific contribution of each gravity variable to each grav-
ity channel, we find that distance is the dominant gravity variable for the channels
of duties/tariffs and transportation costs with random preferences. However, for the
channel of dyadic preferences, which captures virtually all the effects of gravity vari-
ables on U.S. imports, having a common border contributes approximately 45.12%,
followed by distance (approximately 32.23%), colonial relationships (approximately
13.98%), free trade agreements (FTAs; approximately 6.91%), and language (ap-
proximately 1.76%).
Finally, we also investigate the contribution of each given gravity variable through
alternative gravity channels. In the case of random variables, the effects of distance,
common borders, colonial relationships, and common language are shown to be
mostly through transportation costs, whereas the effects of FTAs are through du-
ties/tariffs. In the case of dyadic preferences, however, all gravity variables are shown
to be effective through the channel of dyadic preferences rather than duties/tariffs
or transportation costs.
As a conclusion, the effects of gravity variables on trade can be both through
measured trade costs (of duties/tariffs or transportation costs) and dyadic prefer-
ences. Accordingly, when dyadic preferences are ignored, as in the existing liter-
ature, we show that the effects of gravity variables on trade are mostly through
transportation costs, except for the effects of regional trade agreements that are
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through duties/tariffs (as predicted). When we consider dyadic preferences, how-
ever, we show that the effects of gravity variables on trade are now through the
preferences that dominate the channels of duties/tariffs and transportation costs.
Since all destination-price effects are already captured by the available data in this
study, it is implied that gravity variables mostly work as demand shifters rather
than supply shifters, as implied by the existing literature. This is important from
a policy perspective because policy tools such as duties/tariffs or investment on
transportation technologies are implied as simply not enough to have any impact
on trade; it is rather globalization itself that should be promoted to shift the pref-
erences of destination countries toward partner country products. Therefore, the
consideration of dyadic preferences is essential to understand the effect of gravity
effects on trade.
In summary, the overall effects of gravity variables on trade are mostly shown to
be through dyadic preferences rather than the measured trade costs of transportation
costs or duties/tariffs. This additional channel of dyadic preferences has not been
given sufficient importance in the existing literature, mostly due to the lack of
available data on the subject. Thanks to the detailed data on U.S. imports and the
corresponding measured trade costs, this paper identifies the effects of each gravity
channel by using the implications of a simple model, which is introduced next.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple trade
model. The subsection distinguishes the implications of the model for trade in the
case of random taste parameters and in the case of dyadic preferences. Section 3
introduces the data and the corresponding descriptive statistics. Section describes
the results of the analysis. The subsections depict the estimation results by carefully
connecting the effects of gravity variables on trade, and conduct two types of variance
decomposition analyses. Section 5 concludes.
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3.2 The Model and Empirical Methodology
We model the imports of the U.S. at the good level considering the optimization
problems of individuals in the U.S. and the firms in the source countries.
3.2.1 Individuals and Firms
The individual in the U.S. maximizes the utility of a composite index of goods
at time t:
Ct ≡
∏(
Cjt
)γjt (3.1)
where Cjt represents the composite index of the varieties of good j at time t given
by:
Cjt ≡
(∑
i
(
θjt,i
) 1
ηt
(
Cjt,i
) ηt−1
ηt
) ηt
ηt−1
(3.2)
where Cjt,i is the variety i of good j imported from source country i; ηt > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution across varieties; γjt and θ
j
t,i are taste parameters.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each variety of goods
yields the following demand functions:
Cjt,i = θ
j
t,i
(
P jt,i
P jt
)−ηt
Cjt (3.3)
and
P jt C
j
t = γ
j
tPtCt (3.4)
where
P jt ≡
(∑
i
θjt,i
(
P jt,i
)1−ηt) 11−ηt
(3.5)
is the price index of good j (which is composed of the prices of different varieties),
and
Pt ≡
∏
j
(
P jt
γjt
)γjt
(3.6)
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is the cost of living index (which is composed of the prices of different goods) at
time t. The previous four equations imply that the total value of imports at time t
in terms of good j can be written as follows:
P jt C
j
t =
∑
i
P jt,iC
j
t,i (3.7)
and the total expenditure at time t for all goods can be written as follows:
PtCt =
∑
j
P jt C
j
t
The unique firm in source country i specialized in the production of good j
maximizes its profits by producing variety i of good j to be exported to the U.S.
according to the following profit maximization problem using its pricing to market
strategy:
max
P jt,i
Y jt,i
[
P jt,i − Zjt,i
]
subject to
Y jt,i = C
j
t,i
where Y jt,i is the level of output, and Z
j
t,i is the marginal cost of production that is
given by:
Zjt,i =
Wt,iτ
j
t,i
Ajt
where Wt,i represents the time and source-country specific input costs, A
j
t is time
and good specific productivity, and τ jt,i representing trade costs between the source
country i and the U.S. for good j at time t is further given by:
τ jt,i = τ
j,D
t,i τ
j,T
t,i (3.8)
where τ j,Dt,i represents trade costs of duties/tariffs, and τ
j,T
t,i represents transportation
costs.
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The first order condition for the profit maximization problem implies that:
P jt,i =
(
ηt
ηt − 1
)
Zjt,i (3.9)
where ηt
ηt−1 represents (gross) markups. The source prices (excluding trade costs)
P j∗t,i are implied as follows:
P j∗t,i =
P jt,i
τ jt,i
=
(
ηt
ηt − 1
)
Wt,i
Ajt
(3.10)
3.2.2 Implications for Trade: The Case of Random Taste
Parameters
According to Equation (3.3), the value of U.S. imports is implied as follows:
M jt,i = P
j
t,iC
j
t,i = P
j
t,iθ
j
t,i
(
P jt,i
P jt
)−ηt
Cjt (3.11)
which can be estimated in its log format according to:
logM jt,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trade Data
= (1− ηt)
(
logP jt,i
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Destination-Price Data
+ log
(
Cjt
(
P jt
)ηt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time and Good Fixed Effects
+ log θjt,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Taste Parameters as Residuals
(3.12)
where (log) taste parameters log θjt,i are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables, and
thus they are considered as the residuals. Considering the definition of destination
prices P jt,i = P
j∗
t,i τ
j,D
t,i τ
j,T
t,i due to Equations (3.8) and (3.9), this expression can be
rewritten as follows:
logM jt,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trade Data
= (1− ηt)
(
logP j∗t,i + log τ
j,D
t,i + log τ
j,T
t,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Destination Prices
+ log
(
Cjt
(
P jt
)ηt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time and Good Fixed Effects
+ log θjt,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Taste Parameters as Residuals
(3.13)
where source prices P j∗t,i , together with trade costs of τ
j,D
t,i and τ
j,T
t,i , are simultane-
ously determined in equilibrium. Accordingly, following Zellner and Theil (1962),
55
we employ the estimation methodology of Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) that
simultaneously estimates Equation (3.13) (under the restriction that logP j∗t,i , log τ
j,D
t,i
and log τ j,Tt,i have the same coefficient of 1−ηt representing trade elasticity) together
with the following three expressions representing source prices P j∗t,i , trade costs due
to duties/tariffs τ j,Dt,i , and transportation costs τ
j,T
t,i , respectively:
logP j∗t,i = log
(
ηt
ηt − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time Fixed Effects
+ logWt,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time and Source-Country Fixed Effects
− logAjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time and Good Fixed Effects
+ vj,Pt,i︸︷︷︸
Residuals
and
log τ j,Dt,i = δ
j,D
t +G
D
t,i + v
j,D
t,i (3.14)
and
log τ j,Tt,i = δ
j,T
t +G
T
t,i + v
j,T
t,i (3.15)
where δj,At (for A ∈ {D,T}) represents time and good fixed effects, vj,Dt,i and vj,Tt,i rep-
resent the random components (as residuals), and GAt,i (for A ∈ {D,T}) represents
the effects of basic gravity variables according to the following specification:
GAt,i = dt,i + bot,i + lat,i + cot,i + ftat,i (3.16)
where dt,i is the effect of (log) distance between the source country i and the U.S.,
bot,i is the effect of sharing a land border (i.e., adjacency), lat,i is the effect of sharing
a language, cot,i is the effect of any colonial relationship, and ftat,i is the effect of
country i and the U.S. having a free trade agreement. It is important to emphasize
that the gravity variables that we consider have time-varying effects as suggested
by Bergstrand et al. (2015) who have shown that ignoring the changes in gravity
variables over time may lead into biased estimates.
In order to see the effects of gravity variables on trade in a better way, once the
estimation is achieved, we can rewrite the fitted value of Equation (3.13) as follows:
log M̂ jt,i = Ĝt,i + (1− ηt)
(
log P̂ j∗t,i + δ̂
j,D
t + δ̂
j,T
t
)
+
̂
log
(
Cjt
(
P jt
)ηt)
+ δ̂j,Ut
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where Ĝt,i represents the combined fitted effects of gravity variables according to:
Ĝt,i = (1− ηt)
(
ĜDt,i + Ĝ
T
t,i
)
(3.17)
which can easily be decomposed into effects due to duties/tariffs and transportation
costs, as we will achieve below.
3.2.3 Implications for Trade: The Case of Dyadic Taste Pa-
rameters
If (log) taste parameters are not just i.i.d. random variables (as in Equation
(3.13)) but also functions of gravity variables (i.e., if they are dyadic), they can be
written as follows:
log θjt,i = δ
j,U
t +G
U
t,i + v
j,U
t,i (3.18)
where δj,Ut represents time and good fixed effects, G
U
t,i represents the effects of very
same gravity variables (as described in Equation (3.16)) on taste parameters, and
vj,Ut,i represents the i.i.d. random component of taste parameters. When this expres-
sion is substituted into Equation (3.13), we can obtain:
logM jt,i = (1− ηt)
(
logP j∗t,i + log τ̂
j,D
t,i + log τ̂
j,T
t,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Destination Prices
+ log
(
Cjt
(
P jt
)ηt)
+ δj,Ut︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time and Good Fixed Effects
(3.19)
+ GUt,i︸︷︷︸
Taste Parameters as Gravity Variables
+ vj,Ut,i︸︷︷︸
Residuals
which can be estimated with the same methodology introduced above. Compared to
Equation (3.13) that considers gravity variables affecting trade through duties/tariffs
τ j,Dt,i ’s and transportation costs τ
j,T
t,i ’s, Equation (3.19) is a more general framework
where gravity variables can affect trade also through taste parameters θjt,i’s. There-
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fore, it is very useful to investigate the channels through which gravity variables
affect trade.
In order to see the effects of gravity variables on trade in a better way, we can
rewrite the fitted value of this expression as follows:
log M̂ jt,i = Ĝt,i + (1− ηt)
(
log P̂ j∗t,i + δ̂
j,D
t + δ̂
j,T
t
)
+
̂
log
(
Cjt
(
P jt
)ηt)
+ δ̂j,Ut
where Ĝt,i again represents the combined fitted effects of gravity variables, this time
according to:
Ĝt,i = (1− ηt)
(
ĜDt,i + Ĝ
T
t,i
)
+GUt,i (3.20)
which can also be decomposed into effects due to duties/tariffs, transportation costs,
and taste parameters, as we show in details, below.
3.3 Data
The U.S. import data is derived from the U.S. International Trade Commission.1
The data covers 224 countries at the SITC 4-digit good level for the period from 1996
to 2013. The detailed variables include the following: (1) customs value (defined as
the total price actually paid or payable for merchandise, excluding U.S. import du-
ties, freight, insurance, and other charges),(2) unit of quantity, (3) calculated duties
in values (i.e., the estimated duties are calculated based on the applicable rates of
duty as shown in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule), and (4) import charges (i.e., the
aggregate cost of all freight, insurance, and other charges incurred, excluding U.S.
import duties).
Total trade costs are decomposed into duty/tariff costs and transportation costs;
ad valorem duties/tariffs are calculated by dividing the calculated duties by the cus-
1https : //dataweb.usitc.gov/
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toms value, whereas ad valorem transportation costs are calculated by dividing the
general import charges by the customs value. Import prices (measured at the source)
are calculated by dividing the customs value by the quantity traded. Ignoring miss-
ing observations, the remaining data set constitutes 425,812 observations, consisting
of 822 goods and 177 countries between 1996 and 2013.
We combine the trade data set with the gravity variable data borrowed from
Glick and Rose (2016). In particular, Glick and Rose (2016) obtain data regarding
distance, common borders, colonial relationships and common languages from the
CIA’s World Factbook, whereas they obtain data about regional/free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) from the World Trade Organization. It is important to emphasize
that the data about FTAs change across years, also; e.g., the dummy variable of
FTA takes a value of one after the U.S. starts having an FTA with Australia in
2005, whereas the same dummy takes a value of zero before 2005.
Before continuing with the estimation results, we would like to provide some
descriptive statistics about the combined version of our data sets. The effects of
distance are shown in Figure 3.1, where we distinguish between distant and nearby
countries. As is evident, the shares of U.S. imports are pretty much the same, and
they are stable over time. However, the duties/tariffs decrease significantly over
time for both nearby and distant countries. Although transportation costs have
also been steady up until 2010 or so, they have decreased in recent years, for both
nearby and distant countries.
The effects of having a land border are shown in Figure 3.2, where they also rep-
resent the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries (i.e., Canada
and Mexico) for the U.S. Although the shares of trade are stable over time, both
duties and transportation costs have been reduced, for both NAFTA countries (for
which such trade costs were already low in 1996) and other trade partners (for which
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the reduction in percentage terms has been greater). Having a colonial relationship
does not seem to have a large impact on U.S. imports due to the low trade shares,
as shown in Figure 3.3, where both duties/tariffs and transportation costs follow
similar patterns across the trade partners over time.
FTAs of the U.S. correspond to higher shares of trade over time according to Fig-
ure 3.4, where both duties/tariffs and transportation costs have increased between
the U.S. and its FTA partner countries. Although such trends may seem puzzling,
there is nothing interesting about them, since they are mostly due to new FTAs
established in the early 2000s. Since the new FTA partner countries are either far
away (e.g., Singapore and Australia) or initially have high duties/tariffs, we observe
such increasing trends in trade costs starting from early 2000s.
Finally, as shown in Figure 3.5, the U.S. has imported relatively less over time
from the countries with which it shares a language. Although there is evidence for
decreasing duties/tariffs, independent of having a common language, duties/tariffs
has always been lower in magnitude for the countries that share a language with the
U.S. during our sample period. There is no significant effect of sharing a language
on transportation costs, however.
3.4 Estimation Results
This section interprets the estimation results of our model using a 3SLS esti-
mator. We mainly focus on the effects of trade elasticity of the gravity variables:
common borders, common languages, colonial ties, free trade agreements, and (log)
distance. Each gravity variable will consider the cases in both random and dyadic
preferences. We depict the estimation results in figures to show their pattern over
time. Thereafter, we also connect the estimation results to the relevant discussions
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in the existing literature. Finally, the gravity channel decomposition is provided for
both random and dyadic preferences.
3.4.1 Trade Elasticity of the Gravity Variables
As one of the most important gravity variables in gravity studies, distance and
distance elasticity are discussed first. The estimations for the coefficient of log
distance are available for the regressions based on log duties/tariffs (as shown in
Equation (3.14)) and log transportation costs (as shown in Equation (3.15)) for the
case of random variables, whereas they are also available for the regressions based
on preferences (as shown in Equation (3.18)) for the case of dyadic preferences. The
coefficient estimates over the years are given in Figure 3.6, with the corresponding
details. Specifically, for both cases of random and dyadic preferences, the effects of
distance on transportation costs and duties/tariffs are consistent with the expecta-
tions based on their positive signs (since trade costs are expected to increase with
distance) and magnitude; e.g., the average distance elasticity of observed trade costs,
which is about 0.005, corresponds to distance effects on trade of approximately 7%
(≈ 10000.005×2) for a distance of approximately one thousand miles (when multiplied
by a trade elasticity of about 2), which is consistent with our expectations based on
the actual data on duties/tariffs and transportation costs. Moreover, we consider
the estimations for the distance elasticity of dyadic preferences in Figure 3.6. As is
evident, after controlling for distance effects due to duties/tariffs and transportation
costs, the effects of distance on trade due to preferences is positive during the 1990s,
which is against most of the studies in the literature using distance as a proxy for
such observed trade costs. However, this result is consistent with some other studies
in the literature such as by Yilmazkuday (2016b) who also focus on the effects of
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distance through the preference of consumers toward exotic products coming from
distant countries. The distance elasticity estimates become mostly insignificant over
time (starting from 2005), potentially due to free trade agreements such as NAFTA
showing its effects (gradually starting from 1994) when the U.S. might have started
importing more products from nearby NAFTA countries. And the comparative
trade volume to other remote countries outside NAFTA become insignificant in the
estimation.
For the U.S., the effects of having a common border can also be considered
as investigating the pure effects of NAFTA over time. The coefficient estimates of
having a common border are given in Figure 3.7, where we again distinguish between
the two cases of preferences. Independent of the preference type, as is evident,
the effects of having a common border on transportation costs are significant and
negative starting from the early 2000s, suggesting that transportation costs have
become cheaper over the years, potentially due to the introduction of NAFTA back
in 1994 after which transportation networks might have improved (as consistent with
studies such as by Woudsma, 1999, and Hesse and Rodrigue, 2004). In terms of the
magnitude, since we have log transportation costs on the estimated Equation (3.15),
the average coefficient of about −0.05 corresponds to the U.S. having about 5%
lower transportation costs with NAFTA countries compared to other trade partners,
after controlling for all other factors. Moreover, there is evidence for decreasing
common-border effects on duties/tariffs with NAFTA countries until 2004 (after
which the effects become insignificant). This is exactly what one would expect
due to the details of NAFTA that eliminate duties/tariffs starting in 1994 and
continuing for ten years (with a few tariffs continuing to 15 years) as discussed by
many studies (e.g., Romalis, 2007, and Hakobyan and McLaren, 2016). Regarding
the magnitude of the effects, NAFTA has reduced duties/tariffs from about 3% to
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nothing during our sample period. The effects through dyadic preferences dominate
one more time in terms of their magnitude (compared to the effects on observed
trade costs) in Figure 7. As is evident, the U.S. has strengthened its already-existing
preference toward NAFTA products over time, even after controlling for all other
factors (captured by other gravity variables). In particular, back in 1996, the U.S.
used to have a preference for NAFTA products by about 2, which has increased to
about 2.5 over the years. Regarding the intuition of these numbers, they suggest
that the U.S. has imported about double the amount of products coming from
NAFTA countries compared to other trade partners, after controlling for all other
factors. This result, which can be called adjacency bias or common-border bias, acts
just like the home-bias in trade as discussed in several studies such as by Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2001) as a puzzle that has been shown to be solved by considering the
existence of trade costs. Compared to these studies, this paper shows that such
trade costs mostly manifest through dyadic preferences (rather than transportation
costs or duties/tariffs) when one considers the broader definition of trade costs by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), which we introduced above.
Strong historical trade ties are important to understand the reasons behind cer-
tain trade patterns (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). The empirical literature
based on gravity studies has attempted to capture such effects partly by considering
the historical colonial relationships between countries. As we show in Figure 8, the
effects of having a colonial relationship on transportation costs and duties/tariffs are
considered stable over time, although there are some evidences for increasing trade
costs. It is implied that trade costs between the U.S. and the countries with which it
has historical ties have increased compared to the trade costs between the U.S. and
other trade partners. Nevertheless, the essential part of the picture appears when
the effects of having a colonial relationship on dyadic preferences are investigated.
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In particular, such effects were captured by a coefficient of 1.98 back in 1996, and
this coefficient has decreased to 1.24 in 2012, suggesting that, after controlling for
other factors, the U.S. has preferred importing more from countries with which it
has historical colonial relationships with. However, these effects have been reduced
significantly in recent years. In other words, after controlling for all other factors,
colonial ties have lost some of their importance for U.S. imports.
Although we covered the effects of NAFTA above, the U.S. has regional/free
trade agreements (FTAs) with 20 different countries in total. From a policy per-
spective, it is essential to understand the pure effects of these FTAs to shape the
future global trade policy of the U.S. Since we have only one dummy variable for
FTAs in our regressions (as standard in empirical gravity studies), the results here
should be considered as the effects of FTAs on average across trade partners of the
U.S. The estimation results presented in Figure 9 for transportation costs and du-
ties/tariffs mostly reflect the descriptive statistics regarding FTAs (shown in Figure
3.4). In particular, since the U.S. started having FTAs in the early 2000s with either
distant countries (e.g., Singapore and Australia) or FTA partner countries that ini-
tially had high duties/tariffs, the effects of having an FTA on both transportation
costs and duties/tariffs started increasing in the early 2000s. Our results in Figure
3.9 also show that the effects of FTAs on transportation costs and duties/tariffs
are almost entirely the mirror image of the results on common-border (NAFTA)
effects (in Figure 3.3) along the horizontal axis. Therefore, while transportation
costs and duties/tariffs have decreased over time between the U.S. and Canada and
between the U.S. and Mexico in relative terms, the same measured trade costs have
increased over time between the U.S. and other trade partners with FTAs, again in
relative terms. This result implies that NAFTA has dominated all other FTAs due
to its effect of decreasing both transportation costs and duties/tariffs. When we
64
consider the dyadic preferences of the U.S. for products coming from FTA partner
countries, it is evident that such preferences have been weakened dramatically dur-
ing our sample period. This is again the mirror image of the results regarding the
effects of NAFTA along the horizontal axis, suggesting that NAFTA has dominated
all other FTAs not only due to its reducing impact on measured trade costs but also
due to the shifts that it has created in the U.S. imports demand through preferences
(e.g., adjacency bias or common-border bias ).
Having a common language can facilitate communication between trade part-
ners by reducing language barriers for trade. Our corresponding results are given
in Figure 3.10, where the effects of language are stable over time. While having
a common language coincides with slightly positive (and sometimes insignificant)
effects on transportation costs, it coincides with negative and significant effects on
duties/tariffs. Therefore, having a common language reduces trade costs mostly
through duties/tariffs rather than transportation costs, where negotiation of tariff
rates might have been affected historically or recently through FTAs. In terms of the
magnitude, the higher effects of having a common language appear again when we
consider the effects on dyadic preferences of the U.S. In particular, after controlling
for all other factors, the U.S. has preferred importing relatively more products from
the countries that it shares a language with, and these effects are fairly stable over
time, as also shown in Figure 3.6.
3.4.2 Decomposition of Gravity Channels
Although we covered the magnitude of the effects through each gravity variable
in the previous section, we did not discuss the sources of variation across chan-
nels, in particular, among the three gravity channels, namely, duties/tariffs (DC),
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transportation-costs (TC), and dyadic-preferences (PC). Which gravity channel con-
tributes most to the overall effects of gravity variables on trade? What is the contri-
bution of each gravity variable to a given gravity channel? What is the contribution
of each gravity channel for a given gravity variable? We attempt to answer these
questions by employing variance decomposition analyses across time and space (i.e.,
by pooling all source countries and years) and also by distinguishing between the
cases of random and dyadic preferences.
Random Preferences
In the case of random preferences, we start with investigating the contribution of
each gravity channel to the overall effects of gravity variables on trade. We achieve
this through a variance decomposition analysis by taking the covariance of both
sides in Equation (3.17) (i.e., the fitted values of estimated gravity effects) with
respect to the left hand side variable of Ĝt,i as follows:
cov
(
Ĝt,i, Ĝt,i
)
= cov
(
(1− ηt) ĜDt,i, Ĝt,i
)
+ cov
(
(1− ηt) ĜTt,i, Ĝt,i
)
which can be rewritten in percentage terms as follows by using cov
(
Ĝt,i, Ĝt,i
)
=
var
(
Ĝt,i
)
:
100% =
cov
(
(1− ηt) ĜDt,i, Ĝt,i
)
var
(
Ĝt,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gravity Effects (%) through Duties/Tariffs (DC)
+
cov
(
(1− ηt) ĜTt,i, Ĝt,i
)
var
(
Ĝt,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gravity Effects (%) through Transportation Costs (TC)
where cov (·) and var (·) are the operators of covariance and variance, respectively,
and all variables are pooled across source countries i and time t. The corresponding
results are given in Table 1, where duties/tariffs contribute about 30.55%, whereas
transportation costs contribute about 69.45% to the overall effects of gravity vari-
ables on trade. Therefore, when we ignore dyadic preferences, gravity variables are
mostly effective through transportation costs rather than duties/tariffs.
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Next, we investigate the contribution of each gravity variable to these gravity
channels (in the absence of dyadic preferences). Such results, which are also re-
ported in Table 3.1, are obtained by using the very same variance decomposition
analysis, this time by considering the fitted values of all gravity variables within each
gravity channel. As is evident, distance is the dominant gravity variable for both
duties/tariffs and transportation costs; the contributions of other variables are rela-
tively insignificant, except for the (expected) contribution of FTAs to duties/tariffs,
which is approximately 7.19%.
In the case of random preferences, we also investigate the contribution of each
given gravity variable through alternative gravity channels; the corresponding results
are reported in Table 3.2. As is evident, the effects of distance, common borders,
colonial relationships, and common languages are mostly through transportation
costs, whereas only the effects of FTAs are through duties/tariffs.
Next, we investigate whether these results hold in the case of dyadic preferences,
also.
Dyadic Preferences
In the case of dyadic preferences, for the purpose of investigating the contribution
of each gravity channel to the overall effects of gravity variables on trade, we perform
a variance decomposition analysis by using the very same methodology as above to
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obtain the following :
100% =
cov
(
(1− ηt) ĜDt,i, Ĝt,i
)
var
(
Ĝt,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gravity Effects (%) through Duties/Tariffs
+
cov
(
(1− ηt) ĜTt,i, Ĝt,i
)
var
(
Ĝt,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gravity Effects (%) through Transportation Costs
+
cov
(
GUt,i, Ĝt,i
)
var
(
Ĝt,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gravity Effects (%) through Preferences
The corresponding results are given in Table 3.1, where the channel of dyadic-
preferences dominate the other two channels. Therefore, we can safely claim that
almost all gravity effects on trade are through the channel of dyadic-preferences,
which is introduced in this paper, rather than the standard channels of duties/tariffs
or transportation costs.
When we investigate the contribution of each gravity variable to each of these
gravity channels, we observe that distance is again the dominant gravity variable due
to its contribution to duties/tariffs and transportation costs. Nevertheless, the situ-
ation differs for the contribution of each gravity variable on the additional channel of
dyadic preferences, where having a common border contributes most (approximately
45.12%), followed by distance (approximately 32.23%), colonial relationships (ap-
proximately 13.98%), FTAs (approximately 6.91%), and language (approximately
1.76%). Therefore, the channel of dyadic-preferences is the dominant gravity chan-
nel on trade, with (common) borders contributing most to it.
When we investigate the contribution of each given gravity variable through
alternative gravity channels, the corresponding results are also presented in Table
3.2. As is evident, all gravity variables are effective through the channel of dyadic
preferences rather than duties/tariffs or transportation costs.
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In summary, if one ignores the existence of dyadic preferences, s/he may easily
think that the effects of gravity variables are through the measured trade costs; how-
ever, as we show in this paper, the consideration of dyadic preferences dramatically
changes the decomposition of gravity effects into their components.
3.5 Conclusions
Gravity variables such as distance, common borders, colonial ties, free trade
agreements, and language have been extensively used in empirical studies to cap-
ture the effects of trade costs. By using actual data on transportation costs and
duties/tariffs obtained from U.S. imports, this paper decomposes the overall effects
of gravity variables on trade through three gravity channels: duties/tariffs (DC),
transportation-costs (TC), and dyadic preferences (PC). When PC is ignored, as is
typical in the literature, we show that nearly all gravity effects are due to distance,
in which 29 percent are through DC and 71 percent through TC. However, the ad-
ditional channel of PC is introduced and shown to dominate other channels, with
common borders contributing approximately 45 percent, distance approximately 32
percent, colonial ties approximately percent, free trade agreements approximately 7
percent, and common language approximately 2 percent.
The results are robust to the specification of trade costs (e.g., multiplicative
versus additive trade costs) since we use actual data on transportation costs and
duties/tariffs to construct multiplicative trade costs. The results are also robust to
the consideration of any local distribution costs (that are shown to account for ap-
proximately half of overall trade costs in Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004), since we
already use trade data measured at both the source and destination docks. Accord-
ingly, whenever we proxy dyadic preferences by gravity variables in our regressions,
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it is implied that they capture all other indirect costs of trade, such as time to ship
(as in Hummels and Schaur, 2013), search costs (as in Rauch, 1999), and infor-
mation barriers (as in Portes and Rey, 2005), although the source-country related
costs (such as contracting costs as in Evans, (2001) or insecurity as in Anderson and
Marcouiller, (2002)) are supposedly captured through data on source prices.
Significant policy implications follow. In particular, policy tools such as du-
ties/tariffs or investment in transportation technologies are implied to have an in-
sufficient impact on trade, as advocated in studies such as Harley (1988) and Irwin
and ORourke (2011). It is rather globalization itself that should be promoted to
shift the preferences of destination countries toward partner country products. Ul-
timately, consumers determine their preferences based on their perceptions of the
products rather than pure evidence of quality.
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Table 3.1: Contribution of Each Gravity Channel to Overall Gravity Effects
Random Preferences Dyadic Preferences
Duties/Tariffs Transportation Costs Total Duties/Tariffs Transportation Costs Dyadic Preferences Total
(DC) (TC) (DC) (TC) (PC)
% Contribution of Gravity Channels 30.55% 69.45% 100.00% 0.48% 2.44% 97.08% 100.00%
% Contribution of Individual Variables to Each Gravity Channel:
Distance 92.16% 98.61% 97.00% 92.15% 97.74% 34.34% 32.23%
Common Border 0.30% 1.96% 1.54% 0.29% 2.82% 42.57% 45.12%
Colonial Tie 0.01% 0.08% 0.04% -0.04% 0.06% 14.28% 13.98%
FTA 7.19% 0.31% 2.07% 7.22% 0.18% 6.90% 6.91%
Common Language 0.34% -0.96% -0.65% 0.38% -0.80% 1.91% 1.76%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Notes: This table shows the contribution of each gravity channel to the overall gravity effects. The effects due to each gravity channel is further decomposed into the
effects due to individual variables.
Table 3.2: Contribution of Individual Variables to Overall Gravity Effects
Random Preferences Dyadic Preferences
% Contribution of Individual Duties/Tariffs Transportation Costs Total Duties/Tariffs Transportation Costs Dyadic Preferences Total
Variables to Overall Gravity Effects (DC) (TC) (DC) (TC) (PC)
Distance 29.43% 70.57% 100.00% 0.40% 3.40% 96.20% 100.00%
Common Border 13.54% 86.46% 100.00% -0.41% 2.71% 97.70% 100.00%
Colonial Tie -7.30% 107.30% 100.00% -0.31% 1.28% 99.03% 100.00%
FTA 75.00% 25.00% 100.00% 2.55% 2.63% 94.82% 100.00%
Common Language 39.22% 60.78% 100.00% -1.80% 2.15% 99.65% 100.00%
Notes: This table shows the contribution of each gravity variable to the overall gravity effects.
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Figure 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Effects of Distance
75
Figure 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Effects of Having a Common Border (NAFTA)
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Figure 3.3: Descriptive Statistics: Effects of Having a Colonial Relationship
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Figure 3.4: Descriptive Statistics: Effects of Having a Free Trade Agreement
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Figure 3.5: Descriptive Statistics: Effects of Having a Common Language
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Figure 3.6: Estimates of Distance Elasticity between 1996-2013
80
Figure 3.7: Common-Border Coefficient Estimates between 1996-2013
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Figure 3.8: Colonial-Relationship Coefficient Estimates between 1996-2013
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Figure 3.9: Regional/Free-Trade-Agreement Coefficient Estimates between 1996-
2013
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Figure 3.10: Common-Language Coefficient Estimates between 1996-2013
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CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND MIGRATION FLOWS
4.1 Introduction
Similar to international trade, international migration is also a key component of
modern globalization. The number of international migrants worldwide has reached
258 million in 2017. It was 220 million in 2010, and 173 million in 2000 according to
the United Nations International Migration Report (2017). As documented by the
OECD International Migration Outlook (2017), 4.7 million permanent immigrants
resided in the OECD countries in 2015. The number is expected to grow rapidly in
the next few years. United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, and France
have been the top five OECD countries with permanent inflow of foreigners in recent
years. Meanwhile, the migration inflow pattern in the OECD countries has changed
drastically. Before the 1980s, labor-intensive migration took over the majority of
the migration inflow. In recent years, family-based immigrants and asylum-seekers
from developing and underdeveloped countries have become the main source of the
overall migration inflow (Chiswick and Hatton, 2003).
International migration and globalization have become unavoidable trends. Stud-
ies suggest that the patterns and reasons for global migration have changed in recent
years (Karemera et al., 2000). What exactly power the migration movement? Tradi-
tional gravity analysis is able to explain the initiation of migration by highlighting
migration costs and demographic factors. However, in the era in which we live,
migration is driven by complicated social and economic motivations. Docquier and
Rapoport (2012) express a concern that migration mainly flows from developing and
underdeveloped countries to developed countries and thus causes brain-drain effects
on the human capital stock of underdeveloped countries.
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It seems that the institutional quality of a country affects the human capital flow
and has different effects in the destination and source countries. Different migration
studies (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Dreher et al., 2011; Dimant et al., 2013;
Fitzgerald et al., 2014; Hatton and Williamson, 2003; Mayda, 2010) focus on only
one or some aspects of the institutional quality for a country, such as political insta-
bility, social and economic issues, conflicts, and corruption. This paper contributes
to the existing literature by constructing a set of institutional quality indexes to
consider all the possible socioeconomic and political conditions.
Governments need to provide guidance as to about how the migration decision is
made, and how to understand migration and use it for the country’s own advantage.
Immigration policies can highly impact the labor markets, economic development,
and domestic markets on in both destination OECD countries and source countries.
To explain the determinants of migration flows, the literature emphasizes that tra-
ditional gravity variables, such as the distance between destination and source coun-
tries, are key factors that determine the migration flows. Geographical distance is
the most common proxy for migration costs in studies such as Borjas (2000), Hat-
ton and Williamson (2003), and Fitzgerald et al. (2014). Other common gravity
variables are also used in the most migration studies as proxies for cultural barriers
in migration, such as common borders, common languages, and colonial ties.
In addition to the common proxies for migration costs, the literature emphasizes
that wage differences between the destination and source countries may determine
the migration decisions, also (Borjas, 1994; Borjas, 2000; Chiswick, 1986; Chiswick,
2000; Massey et al., 1999). Most recent studies pay attention to social networks that
potentially connect family and friends. Therefore, immigration stocks are one of the
most important explanatory variables in studies such as Fitzgerald et al. (2014),
Karemera et al. (2000), Mayda (2009), and Pedersen et al. (2008).
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In recent years, migration studies have focused on the specific factors that af-
fect migration decisions in the destination or source countries. Pull factors are
those destination-specific characteristics that attract potential emigrants from cer-
tain source countries. These studies concern socioeconomic and demographic factors
and political institutional conditions in destination countries that affect the migra-
tion decisions of potential immigrants. Push factors are those source-country-specific
characteristics that dissuade citizens residing in source countries from migrate out.
Mainly political conditions, especially political instabilities in source countries, are
main pushing factors that drive migration flows (Fitzgerald et al., 2014; Mayda,
2009; Pedersen et al., 2008).
This paper is motivated by recent advanced studies emphasizing pull and push
factors of migration flows. By using an updated OECD immigration inflow data
from 1984 to 2015, and a set of novel institutional quality indexes, this paper ex-
plores the effects of institutional quality on the immigration rate. The indexes come
from The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which comprises 22 factors
in political, economic, and financial categories to portray the overall risk of an in-
stitution. Among these indexes, we mainly focus on pull effects of socioeconomic
conditions, which come from destination countries, and pushing effects from source
countries, including foreign debt, government stability, budget, internal conflicts,
and corruption conditions.
These institutional quality indexes describe both the destination and source
country characteristics in details. The existing literature suggests that main pulling
effects come from income advantages and employment conditions in the destination
country. Specifically, Pedersen et al. (2008) conclude that they find an effect of em-
ployment on migration inflow in destination countries but no such impact in source
countries. However, regarding the push factors, Karemera et al. (2010) suggest
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that domestic political conditions are the main factors that determine emigration
outflows. Mayda (2009) also notes the existence of the asymmetrical pull and push
factors, where income level and employment conditions in source countries have in-
significant effects on emigration outflows. On the other hand, political issues and
potential government risks will drive potential emigration outflows. Therefore, this
paper mainly uses the destination country socioeconomic condition index to proxi-
mate the pulling effects and uses five other institutional quality indexes to describe
political and government risks to proxy push factors from source countries.
The estimation results in this paper are in conformity with previous studies.
Higher institutional quality in the destination countries increases the immigra-
tion rate. Specifically, higher employment rate and market confidence and a lower
poverty level (socioeconomic condition) draw attention from potential immigrants.
On the other hand, lower institutional quality in source countries decreases potential
emigration outflows. The results provide the governments some guidance regarding
their immigration policies and economic development. The most important thing for
developing and underdeveloped countries is to retain their labor forces and citizens.
For example, corruption risks affect the potential emigration outflow. As noted by
Dimant et al. (2013), corruption control would be an important policy tool to pre-
vent domestic brain drain, where the country in need for development can keep the
talents. Nevertheless, institutional quality is important for countries to maintain
their populations and labor forces. The key goals to prevent emigration outflows
are to keep the government and political structure stable, cease domestic conflicts,
control corruption, and manage the budget and debt for economic development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the empiri-
cal estimation methodologies with random effects and fixed effects estimators. The
variable selection is also described in this section. Section 3 introduces the data
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source and constructs data according to the empirical model. Section 4 summarizes
the empirical results, together with many robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Empirical Methodology
The common framework of the migration models is motivated by the idea that
individuals will maximize their utility by choosing which country to live in. Their
behaviors regarding where to move depend on three key components: the char-
acteristics of the potential migrants, source-country-specific pushing effects, and
destination-country-specific pulling effects (Borjas, 1987; Borjas, 1989; Karemera et
al., 2000; Mayda, 2010; Zavodny, 1997).
The standard theoretical migration models, however, do not restrain or define
the proxy variables for the three components. Therefore, the generalized migration
model has the following form:
mijt = β1Iijt + β2Sit + β3Djt + uijt (4.1)
where mijt is the number of immigrants moving from the source country i to the
destination country j at time t. Iijt is a vector of factors that describe the net gain
of migrants if they decide to move from source country i to destination country j
at time t. Pedersen et al. (2008) also separate Iijt into two parts. One denotes
the network effects of the potential immigrants from the destination country. The
obvious proxy variable is the immigration stocks from the source county to the
destination country. The other one represents the migration costs incurred when
moving from source country i to destination country j. Sit and Djt are vectors of
pushing and pulling factors in the source country i and destination country j that
affect the decisions of potential migrants whether to choose to move or stay. uijt is
a white noise with zero mean and variance σ.
89
For the empirical analysis, the literature proposes different variables to indicate
the three components of the migration function (see Borjas, 1989; Fitzgerald et al.,
2014; Gastil, 1978; Greenwood, 1975; Hatton and Williamson, 2003; Mayda, 2010).
As summarized by Karemera et al. (2000), a complete migration gravity model
contains three groups of variables: traditional gravity variables, such as distance,
common languages, common borders, and colonial ties, which account for the costs
of migration. Variables related to the economic and political conditions in the
source country push the potential emigrants to leave, whereas variables related to
the economic and political conditions in the destination country pull the potential
immigrants to arrive. In this paper, we try to examine the effects of institutional
quality on migration flows. Accordingly, our empirical specification of the migration
model has the following form:
mijt
Pit
= β0 + β1
STOCKijt
Pit
+ β2
GDPperCapitajt
GDPperCapitait
+ β3ldistij + β4borderij + β5colonyij
+ β6comlangij + β7SocioeconomicConditionsjt + β8ForeignDebtit
+ β9BudgetBalanceit + β10GovernmentStabilityit + β11InternalConflictsit
+ β12Corruptionit + uijt
(4.2)
where the new dependent variable
mijt
Pit
is the emigration rate. We normalize the
migration flows by the population of the source country i. This is consistent with
the model derived by Borjas (1999), and Clark et al. (2007), in which the emigration
rate is used to compare the relative sizes of the migration flows with the existence
of heterogeneous source country sizes. The immigration stock variable to proxy the
existing network effects is also divided by the population size of the source country.
GDPperCapitajt
GDPperCapitait
shows the inequality in GDP per capita from the destination country j
and source country i. ldistij is the natural logarithm of the great circle distance be-
tween the source and destination countries. borderij is a dummy variable that takes
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the value of 1 if the source and destination countries share a land border. colonyij
is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the source and destination countries had
colonial ties in the past. comlangij is also a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if the source and destination countries use a common language. All four standard
dummy variables approximate the migration costs to move from source country i
to destination country j. SocioeconomicConditionsjt is an institution quality in-
dex showing the socioeconomic condition of destination country j. ForeignDebtit,
BudgetBalanceit, GovernmentStabilityit, InternalConflictsit, and Corruptionit
are a vector of institutional quality to show the foreign debt condition, government
budget availability, internal conflicts, and the corruption level of the government in
source country i. uijt is an error term with zero mean and a constant variance σ.
In this paper, we use the country-time specific institutional quality indexes in
equation (4.1) to explain the push and pull effects from the source country and
destination country. It is unavoidable for us to solve the endogeneity issue of the
regression, since there are reverse-causality concerns, where not only the difference
of the GDP per capita in two countries affects the decision of potential immigrants
and draws immigrants to the destination country but also more immigrants flow can
impact labor market structural and GDP in the destination country. Another plau-
sible problem is over/underestimating the model with too many/few independent
variables. To solve the endogeneity issue, we include multiple fixed effects, combined
with lagging one year for all time-varying independent variables to account for the
time lag when the immigrants make decisions.
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4.3 Data
In this section, we will construct the data by combining immigration flow, immi-
gration stock, itemized population inflows, institutional quality indexes, and other
country-pair specific variables from different sources. All the immigration data
comes from the International Migration Statistics (IMS) database for the OECD
countries. This data is the extension of the widely used OECD immigration data
used in some recent studies 1. This paper uses data of immigrants inflow from 134
source countries to 33 OECD countries in the period from 1984 to 2015. It is im-
portant to note that the data collection is conducted by each county separately, and
the definition of migrants is different across countries 2, thus, the immigration inflow
data are not perfectly comparable across OECD countries. Therefore, by controlling
the heterogeneity at the destination-country level, the effects of institution quality
can still be compared with our data over time. The collections of immigration inflow
data from each OECD country are also different with respect to the availability of
the time periods and the source countries. For example, the United States started
to document the immigration inflow from the United Kingdom in 1984. Meanwhile,
it only has immigration inflow data for Austria and Denmark available starting in
1997. Some OECD countries have already started to document immigration data
specifying the country of origin since the 1960s, whereas many small-sized traditional
1Pedersen et al. (2008) use immigration inflow and stock data obtained from 26
destination OECD countries during the period 1989-2000. Mayda (2010) uses a similar
data that provides bilateral immigration inflow into 14 core OECD countries in the period
1980-1995. While Fitzgerald et al. (2014) specifically include labor inflow into 18 OECD
countries from over 170 source countries from the period 1980-2006.
2Majority of the OECD countries categorize and define immigrants by their country
of birth. Some define it based on the nationality and citizenship of the immigrants (such
as France and Austria).
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low migration-impacted OECD countries have only started it since 1995, such as
Austria.
Compared to existing studies using OECD immigration inflow, our data has sev-
eral extensions and advantages. As mentioned above with more destination OECD
countries included in the data, and extending the available years to 2015, our data
set contains 54,722 observations on immigration inflow. The majority of the studies
use the immigration inflow data even though there are concerns about comparability
due to the complicity of definitions. Fitzgerald et al. (2014) use labor migrants data
to exam the political considerations in shaping migration decisions of the potential
labor migrants. We provide extra variables to allow us to entirely understand the
migration behaviors. In addition to the immigration inflow and immigration stock
yearly data, we also include worker inflow, seasonal worker inflow, and foreign stu-
dent inflow yearly data. Within the discussion of the institution quality, it not only
affects the general immigration inflows, but also impacts certain groups of immi-
grants, such as workers who see financial security of an institution more important
than the political openness.
Our data also includes a set of standard independent variables commonly used
in migration studies. The population and GDP per capita values for the destina-
tion country j and source country i come from World Bank Open Data Catalog3.
Four standard gravity variables (ldistij, borderij, colonyij, and comlangij) are from
Reuven and Rose (2016).
To explain the immigration rate from institutional quality, we apply the country
risk data obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The specific
variable that we use to explain the pulling effects from the destination countries is
SocioeconomicConditions. The reason is that majority of the OECD destination
3https://data.worldbank.org/
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countries share similar political and economic attributes, where they tend to have
low external and internal conflicts, low military impact in politics, and low religion
tensions. On the economic side, OECD countries have stable financial systems and
mature economic growth rates. The attributes that set all the OECD countries
apart are their different domestic unemployment rates and working conditions, con-
sumer market structures and poverty levels. The socioeconomic conditions calculate
the risk of a country exactly with these three sub-components: unemployment, con-
sumer confidence, and property.
The institutional quality used to explain the pushing effects from the original
countries are considered in terms of both political risks and economic risks. The
ForeignDebt variable indicates the foreign debt as a percentage of GDP in destina-
tion countries, the variable BudgetBalance calculates the estimated central govern-
ment budget balance and grants for a given year as a percentage of the estimated
GDP in destination countries. These two indexes indicate the economic risks of a
country where the potential emigrants worry about the domestic economical condi-
tions and the capability that their government can improve the living and working
conditions of its citizens. The variables GovernmentStability, Internalconflicts,
and Corruption indicate political risks for the potential institute to loose its po-
tential emigrants. Specifically, GovernmentStability assesses the unity, legislative
strength, and the popularity among citizens of the government. Internalconflicts
assesses whether an country is dealing with civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political
violence, and civil disorders. Corruption measures the degree of corruption within
the political system of the country.
As we introduced the institutional quality variables above, it is obvious to con-
sider that potential emigrants will change their decisions of whether to stay or leave
their home countries since the variables reflect a country’s economic and political
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conditions, where less stabilized and more corrupt governments tend to encour-
age potential emigrants to move outside of their home countries. Moreover, when
potential immigrants make the decision of where to relocate, they look for better
socioeconomic conditions of a potential destination country, where the labor market
thrives and the consumers are confident.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Benchmark
Table 4.4 reports the benchmark results. With the dependent variable being
the natural logarithm of the emigration rate (inflow foreign population from source
country i to destination country j divided by the population of source country i) and
using the random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, the estimates
are shown to be consistent with the predictions and previous literature.
First, the control variables of the baseline models in column 1 and column 2
consist of the rate of immigration stock, GDP per capita ratio, and common grav-
ity variables that are widely used in the immigration literature, such as the log
geographic distance, land borders, colonial ties, and common languages. The re-
sults show that the immigration rate is positively related to the (log) percentage
of existing immigration stocks at destination country to the source country popula-
tion. Specifically, every 1 percent increase in the immigration stock rate increases
by approximately 0.8 percent the immigration rate to the destination country. This
denotes the network effects of the immigration rate, where the existing immigration
stock in the destination country provides useful information and helps potential im-
migrants overcome language barriers, asymmetric information on the labor market.
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All of these are reasonable to draw attentions from the potential immigrants and
cause increases in the immigration rate. Moreover, even though the network effects
from the existing immigration stock are prominent and positive, the increasing rate
of immigration (0.8 percent) is still smaller than the increasing rate of immigration
stock (1 percent).
The model also obtains similar results where the (log) GDP per capita differ-
ences between destination and source countries affect the immigration rate posi-
tively. Specifically, every 1 percent increase in GDP per capita ratio between desti-
nation country and source country will lead to an approximately 1 percent increase
in immigration rate. Considering the case that GDP per capita in the destination
country increases by 1 percent, whereas the GDP per capita in the source country
is unchanged, there will be a 1 percent increase in the immigration rate. The bigger
the GDP per capita gap between destination and source countries is, the higher
income the destination country generally has, or the lower the income the source
country has. In either case, potential immigrants have incentives to move to the
destination country. Comparing columns 3 and 6, the coefficients in front of the
control variables do not have significant changes, except for lnGDPperHeadRatio.
As the evidence in column 6, in which case all control variables are included to avoid
any omitted variables bias, the coefficient value of lnGDPperHeadRatio remains
significant but decreases to 0.632 from 1.067.
For the common gravity variables, we explore the effects of the geographic (dis-
tance and common borders) and cultural (colonial ties and common language) vari-
ables on the costs incurred during the migration. As expected, the geographical
distance has a negative relationship with the immigration rate, and both colonial
ties and common language have positive effects on the immigration rate. Com-
mon borders do not have significant effects on the immigration rate in any baseline
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model. More specifically, a 1 percent increase in the geographical distance between
the destination and source country causes a decrease in the immigration rate of ap-
proximately 0.075 percent. Keeping all other factors equal, by doubling the distance
between the destination and source country, there will be a 7.5 percent increase in
potential emigrants from the source country who choose to move to the destination
country. Colonial ties and common language between the source country and the
destination country will improve the immigration rate by approximately 20 percent
and 14.5 percent. Moreover, the significant effects of colonial ties and common lan-
guage on immigration rate in Table 1 are consistent with different models. This
result is inconsistent with the findings of Mayda (2010), where common language
and colonial ties do not appear to play any significant role in determining the im-
migration rate.
In columns 3 through 6, one destination-country institution quality index and
five source-country institutional quality indexes are added one by one to the base-
line model. These coefficients of added independent variables are aligned with
the expectation. Specifically, the coefficient of SocioeconomicConditions is 0.0898
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Since the institutional quality in-
dex describes the socioeconomic pressures in the destination country measured in
the scale from 0 to 12, this estimation result implies that a 1 point increase in
SocioeconomicConditions in the destination country is associated with an almost
9 percent increase in the immigration rate.
All the five source-country institutional quality indexes have negative effects on
the immigration rate. Due to the fact that these push factors from the source
country should affect the decision-making of potential emigrants, higher institu-
tional quality in the source country would decrease the emigration rate. As shown
in column 6, with all control variables, the coefficient of ForeignDebt is approx-
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imately -0.02, which means a 1 point increase in ForeignDebt index 4 from the
source country is associated with around 2 percent decrease in immigration rate.
Similarly, 1 point increase in BudgetBalance index5 from the source country is as-
sociated with around 0.9 percent decrease in the immigration rate. 1 point increase
in GovernmentStability index6 from the source country is associated with around
1.4 percent decrease in the immigration rate. 1 point increase in InternalConflicts
index7 is associated with around 2.2 percent decrease in the immigration rate. Last
but not least, 1 point increase in Corruption index8 is associated with around 2.3
percent decrease in the immigration rate.
4.4.2 Robustness
Generally, endogeneity is the first problem in panel analyses. Especially in
three-dimensional data, both unobserved destination-country and source-country
4ForeignDebt measures the foreign debt services as a percentage of GDP. The value
of the ForeignDebt index is on a scale from 0 to 10. The bigger the index, the higher the
institutional quality the country has.
5BudgetBalance measures the central government budget balance (including grants)
for a given year as the percentage of the estimates GDP. The value for the BudgetBalance
index ranges from 0 to 10. The bigger the index the higher the institutional quality the
country has.
6GovernmentStability measures the ability of the government to carry out declared
programs and stay in office. It also consists of three assessment: government unity, leg-
islative strength, and popularity. The value for the GovernmentStability index ranges
from 0 to 12. The bigger the index, the higher the institutional quality a country has.
7InternalConflicts measures political violence in the country and the potential impact
of it on governance. The value for the InternalConflicts index ranges from 0 to 12. The
bigger the index, the higher the institutional quality the country has.
8Corruption measures financial corruption within country’s political system. The
value for the Corruption index ranges from 0 to 6. The bigger the index, the higher the
institutional quality the country has.
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specific effects could cause a biased estimation. There are several concerns regard-
ing the omitted variable problem. First, to determine the cause of migration (im-
migration rate), we look at the potential pull factors from the destination country.
SocioeconomicConditions may have a positive effect on the immigration rate. How-
ever, it is unclear whether a potential immigrant would be more willing to relocate
to a destination country with better socioeconomic conditions or whether they are
attracted by some other attributes that a destination country has because of good
socioeconomic conditions. For the same reason, the push factors of institutional
quality from source country might be a possible reason to push potential emigrants
to relocate to other countries. It is also possible that other unobserved push factors
lead to relocation of potential emigrants. To solve the omitted variables issue, Table
5 introduces several groups of dummy variables to control for different combinations
of fixed effects.
Table 4.5 is based on the model in column 6 of Table 4.4 which includes all
control variables. The destination-country fixed effects and source-country fixed
effects are introduced in column 1 to account for the unobserved destination and
source country specific effects. Compared with the random effects model in the
column 6 of Table 4.4, there is no sign change in the coefficients, and all the co-
efficients are significant except for border and BudgetBalance. The coefficients
of ln(immigration stock/source population), ldist, colony, and comlang are un-
changed. The coefficient of lnGDPperHeadRatio increases from 0.632 to 0.998,
which means the effect of GDP per capita differences on immigration rate is big-
ger. Regarding the institutional quality indexes, we notice that the pulling effects
are increased with the coefficient changes from 0.0898 to 0.0966. However, source-
country institutional quality indexes have less pushing effects in general after the
fixed effects of destination and source countries are introduced.
99
Column 2 of Table 4.5 introduces another set of dummy variables as time fixed
effects. In addition to the unobserved destination-country and the source-country
specific effects, the time-varying unobserved effects are also considered in this model.
The coefficients in the entire column 2 are unchanged compared to the random ef-
fects model. In the next column, we consider the omitted bias comes from the
unobserved country-pair specific effects. The purpose of this set of dummy vari-
ables is to perfectly replace the gravity/dyadic variables in the model. Therefore,
the gravity variables are omitted in columns 3, 4, and 5, in which country-pair fixed
effects are included. Since country-pair specific attributes that affect the immigra-
tion rate are explained using country-pair fixed effects, the country-time specific
institutional qualities will do a better job at explaining the immigration rate. Col-
umn 4 also includes time fixed effects in addition to the country-pair fixed effects.
Column 5 incorporates time, destination-country, source-country, and country-pair
fixed effects. We can see that the network effects from the immigration stock have
not changed compared with the random effect model with the coefficient of 0.806.
The GDP per capita difference from the destination and source country still has
strong effects on immigration rate, also, with a coefficient of 0.831. For the pull and
push factors, both models in the column 4 and 5 are the same, where socioeconomic
conditions in the destination country affect the immigration rate positively, whereas
the foreign debt rate and the budget balance, government stability, internal conflicts,
and corruption level of the source country have negative effects on the immigration
rate.
Table 4.6 considers the reverse causality issue for this panel analysis. This is
also an unavoidable problem when we consider the estimation results. For example,
the coefficient of the immigration stock rate is expected to be positive in the esti-
mation, because the model predict that positive shocks on immigration stock will
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increase the network effects between the potential immigrants and the immigration
stocks from the same source country. However, this positive relationship between
immigration stock rate and immigration rate may represent the causation of these
two variables in the opposite direction, where simply more immigration will increase
the immigration stock rate in the destination country. Another example would be
the pull effects of the socioeconomic condition in the destination country. A better
socioeconomic environment means a better labor market and higher market confi-
dence. These attributes all draw immigrants’ attention and bring them in. However,
it is plausible to argue that the incoming immigrants represent a strongly motivated
labor force and high purchasing power, and therefore help to build up the strong
socioeconomic conditions in the destination country.
Due to the reverse causality issue, it is possible for underestimation to occur.
In Table 4.6, we use lagged values for all control variables 9 to explain immigration
rate. It is more realistic to claim that the institutional qualities last period will have
impacts on the migration decision this period, since people make decisions based on
past information and experiences. However, the immigration decision in this period
will have no effect on past institutional qualities.
As shown in columns 1 to 5, we run the regressions from Table 4.5 with the
same fixed effects. The results of the new estimations have unchanged signs for
all coefficients and are significant. border has a significant and negative effect on
the immigration rate, compared with having an insignificant effect in old models.
Specifically, having a land border between destination and source country will lead
to a 15.2 percent decrease in the immigration rate. A plausible explanation is that
most countries that share borders with an OECD country are also developed coun-
9Notice that the lagged value for gravity/dyadic variables such as ldist, border,
colonry, and comlang are unchanged because they are not time-related variables.
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tries or OECD countries themselves. In these cases, the immigration rate would be
higher if the source country were a developing country, where institutional quality
tends to be lower. The effects of colony and comlang are significantly larger than in
Table 4.5. Having a colonial tie increases the immigration rate by 51.3 percent, and
sharing a common language increases the immigration rate by almost 31 percent.
The coefficients of immigration stock rate and GDP per capita differences are
significantly smaller compared with the estimation in Table 5. For the institutional
quality indexes, socioeconomic condition as a pull factor from the destination coun-
try has a larger impact on the immigration rate, with a coefficient change from 0.089
to 0.101. The push effects also have larger effects on the immigration rate for all
source country institutional quality indexes.
4.4.3 Further Robustness
Alternative Migration Data
One of the innovation in this paper is the alternative migration data we use to
explain the importance of institutional quality on migration decision making. After
examining the effects of institutional qualities on immigration rate, we look closely
into how the different institutional qualities will affect migration decisions for dif-
ferent demographics.
Table 4.7 reports the effects of institutional qualities on the inflow of foreign
workers. The most important difference for the inflow of foreign workers is that
they rely less on network effects. However, their decisions about whether to move
to a destination country reply strongly on economic reasons. Specifically, according
to the coefficients of GDP per capita difference, workers are more than twice as
sensitive to GDP per capita differences between the destination and source coun-
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try. A 1 percent increase in GDP per capita difference leads to an approximately
2 percent increase in the inflow of foreign workers. Moreover, the pull effects from
destination-country socioeconomic conditions are 5 times larger for inflow foreign
workers compared with overall immigrants. On the other hand, push factors from the
source country play lesser roles in emigrants’ decision-making. Only ForeignDebt,
GovernmentStability, and InternalConflicts have weak but significant effects on
foreign workers’ relocation decisions. In addition, the standard gravity variables
affect foreign workers’ reallocation costs more. Having colonial ties and a common
language play larger roles in deciding whether workers choose to relocate.
Table 4.8 introduces the effects of institutional qualities on seasonal foreign work-
ers. The estimation shows that most of the coefficients are insignificant. Pull factors
from destination country have no influence on the seasonal foreign workers’ decision-
making. However, their domestic economic conditions have weak but positive effects
on seasonal workers migrating out for temporary seasonal jobs. Gravity variables
are the only predominant factors that affect seasonal workers. Colonial ties increase
the seasonal worker inflow to the destination country by 140 percent. It is more
than double the size compared to other non-colonial relationship countries. How-
ever, common language decreases the seasonal workers inflow by almost 70 percent
using our data set.
Another group of special categories of immigrants is inflow foreign students.
They migrate to take advantages of the destination-country’s education systems
and future job opportunities. Table 4.9 presents estimations of how institutional
qualities affect inflow foreign students. As expected, the network effects from the
existing immigration stock in the destination country have weak but positive effects
on foreign students’ decision-making regarding whether to obtain their educations
there. The GDP per capita difference does not increase the inflow of foreign stu-
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dents, since the purpose for the students to move to the destination country is to
consume education. The richer the source country compared with the OECD des-
tination country, the greater the purchasing power the potential outflow students
have. Moreover, the pull effects from destination country play an important role in
the students’ attraction. However, the push effects from the source country have no
significant effects on the students’ decision-making.
Nonlinearity in Network Effects
Social network effects are employed by Fitzgerald et al. (2014) to explain the
gravity of international migration. They argue that by distinguishing whether there
are existing immigration stocks, they can determine the factors that affect original
immigration behaviors and the changes in those factors when there are increasing
immigration stocks. The importance of social networks to reduce the costs and risks
associated with migration depends on the amount of immigration stocks. All the
pulling and pushing factors also behave differently in the effects of migration deci-
sions.
Table 4.10 considers the nonlinear effects of social networks on the immigration
rate. Column 1 shows the estimation with the pooled immigration stock rate. We
compare it with the set of models from columns 2 to 6 using immigration stock rate
in the different percentiles. In column 2, when there are small immigration stocks,
the social network effects are relatively small. The immigration stock rate itself has
weaker effects on the immigration rate compared to the pooled sample. In addition,
the GDP per capita difference is not a concern for the potential immigrants. Mean-
while, geographic distance and common land borders are the most important factors
affecting the immigration rate. This conclusion is consistent with Fitzgerald et al.
(2014). In addition, the pull effects are significant and positive, which means that
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socioeconomic conditions in the destination country are still important in migrants’
decision-making. Push effects do not affect immigration when the network effects
are small.
While the existing immigration stock increases, the immigration rate is increased.
At the same time, the effects of geographic distance and land border on immigration
rate diminish, which means the social networks can prominently reduce the migra-
tion costs and offset the costs from geographical barriers. Regarding the institutional
quality, the pulling effects of socioeconomic conditions affect the immigration rate
positively and significantly regardless of existing immigration stocks and network
effects. All the pushing effects from institutional quality indexes in source coun-
try have no effect on immigration decisions, especially when there are less existing
immigration stocks and social network effects.
OECD VS. Non-OECD Countries
Table 4.11 compares how the immigration from different source countries would
be affected differently by control variables, especially the network effects and insti-
tutional quality indexes. By splitting source countries into OECD and non-OECD
countries, we run all possible benchmark models, lagged-value models, and fixed
effects models. The first three columns present the immigration rates from the
OECD source countries. The final three columns report the immigration rates from
non-OECD countries.
Due to the similarity among most OECD countries, the potential immigrants
from OECD source countries rely less on the existing network effects from the im-
migration stocks compared to the potential immigrants from non-OECD countries.
Standard gravity variables also affect the immigration rate more strongly for poten-
tial immigrants from non-OECD source countries.
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Finally, the institutional quality indexes that describe pull and push factors also
affect immigration rate slightly differently. Specifically, socioeconomic conditions in
the destination country affect migration decisions less for potential immigrants from
OECD source countries, also. For push factors, we notice that potential immigrants
from OECD source counties are more affected by their own domestic economic con-
ditions, such as foreign debt conditions and government budget balance conditions.
However, political related institutional qualities affect the immigration rate more in
non-OECD source countries, such as government stability and internal conflicts.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper uses an updated source-country-specific immigration inflow data set
from 33 OECD destination countries between 1984 and 2015 to examine the gravity
model of migration. Combining institutional quality indexes from the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), this paper demonstrates the importance of institu-
tional quality in both the destination and source countries for determining migration
flows.
The modified empirical model summarizes the findings of previous studies. The
common gravity variables as proxies for the migration costs affect migration flow
negatively, such as geographic distance, common border, colonial tie, and common
language. The results of the estimations also show that one of the most important
factors is network effects from existing immigration stocks in the destination coun-
try. These network effects provide information to potential immigrants from family
and friends who reside in the destination countries. As predicted, it reduces the
migration costs and increases the chance for potential immigrants to land jobs and
settle after relocation.
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Finally, the innovation of this paper is to incorporate unique institutional qual-
ity measurements into the explanation of the pull and push factors in the model.
This is the first study to fully integrate both economic and political, pull and push
factors with institutional quality indexes to explain the patterns of migration flow.
The results are aligned with the literature, in which institutional quality matters for
the determination of migration. Better socioeconomic condition in the destination
countries (pull factor), worse debt and budget conditions, lower stability of the gov-
ernment, more internal conflicts and corruption in the source countries yield higher
immigration inflow from source to destination countries.
The policy implications are specifically important for developing and underde-
veloped countries to keep their labor farce and citizens, and prevent brain-drain
effects which could potentially damage the labor market and economic growth of
those countries in the long run.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics and data sources
Count Mean Std.Dev Min Max
lninpopperpop 54722 -11.75264 2.428593 -23.9397 -3.72645
lninworkerperpop 24937 -12.89048 2.2603 -19.47161 -4.626491
lninseasonworkerperpop 4896 -13.41259 3.140172 -21.03897 -4.87396
lnforeignstudentsperpop 6557 -14.08104 2.385284 -21.03389 -4.136038
lnstockperpop 42251 -9.933965 2.732961 -22.69102 -1.73629
lngdpratio 119630 1.236518 .2511128 .7419261 2.349159
Land Border Dummy 135003 .0241476 .1535079 0 1
Dummy for pairs ever in Colonial Relationship 135003 .0243698 .1541951 0 1
1 for Common Language 135003 .1096865 .3124997 0 1
Log of Distance 135003 8.076017 .8748306 4.13298 9.416901
SocioeconomicConditions 125946 7.638018 1.655893 2 11
Debt Service as a % of XGS 118862 8.115373 1.7416 0 13.29167
Budget Balance 127606 5.70373 1.797101 0 10
GovernmentStability1 127576 7.596499 2.0745 .6666667 12
InternalConflicts1 126871 8.82185 2.446831 0 12
Corruption1 126871 2.968217 1.326876 0 6
Table 4.2: List of OECD countries:
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Republic
Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece
Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan
Latvia Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland
Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia South Korea Spain Sweden
Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States
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Table 4.3: List of non-OECD source countries:
Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Armenia
Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Belarus
Bolivia Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria
Burkina Faso Cameroon China Colombia Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Dominican Republic
Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Ethiopia Gabon
Ghana Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti
Honduras Hong Kong, China India Indonesia Iran
Iraq Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya
Kuwait Lebanon Liberia Libya Lithuania
Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Malta
Moldova Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar
Namibia Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman
Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru
Philippines Qatar Romania Russia Saudi Arabia
Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone Singapore Somalia
South Africa Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Syria
Tanzania Thailand Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia
Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates Uruguay Venezuela
Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe
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Table 4.4: Benchmark: The determines of inflow foreign population (pooled sample)
Dependent variable: Log of emigration rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(immigrant stock/source population) 0.805∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0118)
lnGDPperHead Ratio (Destination/Source) 1.067∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗ 0.632∗∗
(0.267) (0.267) (0.266) (0.275) (0.267) (0.273)
ldist -0.0675∗∗ -0.0753∗∗ -0.0763∗∗ -0.0855∗∗∗ -0.0833∗∗∗ -0.0880∗∗∗
(0.0284) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0309)
border -0.0975 -0.0960 -0.105 -0.106 -0.107
(0.0795) (0.0792) (0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0803)
colony 0.210∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0666) (0.0668) (0.0669)
comlang 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0427) (0.0428) (0.0428)
SocioeconomicConditions 0.0873∗∗∗ 0.0890∗∗∗ 0.0887∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗
(Destination) (0.00739) (0.00734) (0.00731) (0.00731)
ForeignDebt -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00472) (0.00472)
BudgetBalance -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.00850∗∗
(Source) (0.00411) (0.00403)
GovernmentStability -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0139∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00413) (0.00407)
InternalConflicts -0.0280∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00583) (0.00586)
Corruption -0.0242∗∗ -0.0226∗∗
(Source) (0.0110) (0.0109)
cons -4.283∗∗∗ -4.291∗∗∗ -4.846∗∗∗ -4.485∗∗∗ -4.043∗∗∗ -3.915∗∗∗
(0.430) (0.432) (0.431) (0.441) (0.443) (0.447)
N 32757 32757 32733 32250 32420 32247
r2 0.931 0.932 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of emigration rate (inflow foreign population from country i (source
country) to country j (destination country) divided by the population in country i) in year t. The data covers yearly foreign
population inflow from 133 source countries (including OECD members) to 34 OECD countries in the 1984-2015 period.
The estimation method is GLS estimation. All models include a vector of time, destination, and source country fixed
effects. Standard errors, clustered by country-pair, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.5: Robustness 1: The determines of inflow foreign population with fixed effects
Log of emigration rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(immigrant stock/source population) 0.797∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0181)
lnGDPperHead Ratio (Destination/Source) 0.998∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.273) (0.271) (0.293) (0.293)
ldist -0.0890∗∗∗ -0.0880∗∗∗
(0.0310) (0.0309)
border -0.105 -0.107
(0.0803) (0.0803)
colony 0.205∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.0673) (0.0669)
comlang 0.146∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0429) (0.0428)
SocioeconomicConditions 0.0966∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0960∗∗∗ 0.0895∗∗∗ 0.0895∗∗∗
(Destination) (0.00597) (0.00731) (0.00597) (0.00730) (0.00730)
ForeignDebt -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗∗ -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.0194∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00452) (0.00472) (0.00459) (0.00480) (0.00480)
BudgetBalance 0.0000737 -0.00850∗∗ 0.000358 -0.00814∗∗ -0.00814∗∗
(Source) (0.00361) (0.00403) (0.00362) (0.00405) (0.00405)
GovernmentStability -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.0139∗∗∗ -0.0107∗∗∗ -0.0139∗∗∗ -0.0139∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00348) (0.00407) (0.00352) (0.00409) (0.00409)
InternalConflicts -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ -0.0181∗∗∗ -0.0228∗∗∗ -0.0228∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00552) (0.00586) (0.00553) (0.00588) (0.00588)
Corruption -0.0254∗∗ -0.0226∗∗ -0.0252∗∗ -0.0224∗∗ -0.0224∗∗
(Source) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0109)
cons -4.407∗∗∗ -3.915∗∗∗ -5.572∗∗∗ -4.944∗∗∗ -4.944∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.447) (0.327) (0.428) (0.428)
N 32247 32247 32247 32247 32247
r2 0.932 0.933 0.862 0.874 0.874
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Source Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of emigration rate (inflow foreign population from
country i (source country) to country j (destination country) divided by the population in country i) in year t.
The data covers yearly foreign population inflow from 133 source countries (including OECD members) to 34
OECD countries in the 1984-2015 period. The estimation method is GLS estimation. Standard errors, clustered
by country-pair, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Model (1) includes a vector of source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model(2)
includes a vector of time, source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model (3) includes a vector of
country-pair fixed effects. Model(4) includes a vector of time, and country-pair fixed effects. Model (5) includes
a vector of time, source-country, destination-country, and country-pair fixed effects.
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Table 4.6: Robustness 2: The determines of inflow foreign population at t− 1
Log of emigration rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(immigrant stock/source population) (t− 1) 0.616∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0185)
lnGDPperHead Ratio (Destination/Source) (t− 1) 0.838∗∗∗ 0.598∗ 0.405 0.390 0.390
(0.275) (0.309) (0.294) (0.330) (0.330)
ldist -0.382∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0340)
border -0.152∗ -0.152∗
(0.0876) (0.0876)
colony 0.513∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.0871) (0.0864)
comlang 0.308∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.0492) (0.0490)
SocioeconomicConditions (t− 1) 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(Destination) (0.00632) (0.00795) (0.00637) (0.00788) (0.00788)
ForeignDebt (t− 1) -0.0207∗∗∗ -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.0189∗∗∗ -0.0255∗∗∗ -0.0255∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00515) (0.00536) (0.00526) (0.00551) (0.00551)
BudgetBalance (t− 1) -0.000516 -0.0110∗∗ -0.000907 -0.0104∗∗ -0.0104∗∗
(Source) (0.00394) (0.00454) (0.00394) (0.00454) (0.00454)
GovernmentStability (t− 1) -0.0155∗∗∗ -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗ -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0162∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00377) (0.00464) (0.00377) (0.00465) (0.00465)
InternalConflicts (t− 1) -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.0330∗∗∗ -0.0330∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00602) (0.00639) (0.00618) (0.00665) (0.00665)
Corruption (t− 1) -0.0442∗∗∗ -0.0415∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗∗ -0.0474∗∗∗ -0.0474∗∗∗
(Source) (0.0115) (0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0123) (0.0123)
cons -2.532∗∗∗ -2.225∗∗∗ -7.099∗∗∗ -7.102∗∗∗ -7.102∗∗∗
(0.429) (0.462) (0.373) (0.464) (0.464)
N 30234 30234 30234 30234 30234
r2 0.917 0.918 0.848 0.848 0.848
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Source Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of emigration rate (inflow foreign population from country i
(source country) to country j (destination country) divided by the population in country i) in year t. The values of all
the independent variables are measured in year t − 1. lnstockforeign (t-1) measures the natural logarithm of foreign
population stock in year t − 1. The data covers yearly foreign population inflow from 133 source countries (including
OECD members) to 34 OECD countries in the 1984-2015 period. The estimation method is GLS estimation. Standard
errors, clustered by country-pair, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. Model (1) includes a vector of source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model(2)
includes a vector of time, source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model (3) includes a vector of country-
pair fixed effects. Model(4) includes a vector of time, and country-pair fixed effects. Model (5) includes a vector of
time, source-country, destination-country, and country-pair fixed effects.
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Table 4.7: Further Robustness 1: The determines of inflow foreign workers with fixed effects
log (inflow foreign workers / source country population)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(immigrant stock/source population) 0.523∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(0.0297) (0.0311) (0.0493) (0.0551) (0.0551)
lnGDPperHead Ratio (Destination/Source) 2.394∗∗∗ 1.565∗ 2.157∗∗ 1.913∗ 1.913∗
(0.866) (0.920) (0.940) (0.997) (0.997)
ldist -0.176∗∗ -0.137∗
(0.0792) (0.0803)
border -0.604∗ -0.614∗
(0.347) (0.345)
colony 0.700∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.210)
comlang 0.587∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.112)
SocioeconomicConditions 0.443∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗
(Destination) (0.0299) (0.0307) (0.0297) (0.0308) (0.0308)
ForeignDebt -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.0260 -0.0396∗∗ -0.0296∗ -0.0296∗
(Source) (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0160)
BudgetBalance -0.0193∗∗ -0.0105 -0.0228∗∗ -0.0108 -0.0108
(Source) (0.00931) (0.0115) (0.00933) (0.0116) (0.0116)
GovernmentStability -0.00299 -0.0204∗ -0.0102 -0.0196∗ -0.0196∗
(Source) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0116)
InternalConflicts -0.0379 -0.0415 -0.0414∗ -0.0445∗ -0.0445∗
(Source) (0.0238) (0.0253) (0.0239) (0.0254) (0.0254)
Corruption 0.0800∗∗ 0.0542 0.0831∗∗ 0.0538 0.0538
(Source) (0.0390) (0.0415) (0.0394) (0.0420) (0.0420)
cons -12.40∗∗∗ -11.37∗∗∗ -14.53∗∗∗ -13.92∗∗∗ -13.92∗∗∗
(1.196) (1.259) (1.241) (1.446) (1.446)
N 13692 13692 13692 13692 13692
r2 0.756 0.760 0.286 0.309 0.309
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Source Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of inflow foreign workers from country i (source
country) to country j (destination country) divided by the population in country i in year t. The data
covers yearly foreign population inflow from 133 source countries (including OECD members) to 34 OECD
countries in the 1984-2015 period. The estimation method is GLS estimation. Standard errors, clustered by
country-pair, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Model (1) includes a vector of source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model(2)
includes a vector of time, source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model (3) includes a vector
of country-pair fixed effects. Model(4) includes a vector of time, and country-pair fixed effects. Model (5)
includes a vector of time, source-country, destination-country, and country-pair fixed effects.
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Table 4.8: Further Robustness 2: The determines of inflow seasonal foreign workers with fixed effects
log (inflow seasonal foreign workers / source country population)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(immigrant stock/source population) 0.270∗∗ 0.248∗∗ 0.0693 -0.0341 -0.0341
(0.121) (0.114) (0.242) (0.235) (0.235)
lnGDPperHead Ratio (Destination/Source) 5.433∗ 0.705 5.138 0.161 0.161
(2.960) (3.056) (3.120) (3.329) (3.329)
ldist -1.091∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.250)
border 0.506 0.553
(0.472) (0.480)
colony 1.413∗∗∗ 1.489∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.467)
comlang -0.683∗ -0.686∗
(0.358) (0.358)
SocioeconomicConditions 0.118∗∗ 0.0237 0.141∗∗∗ 0.0402 0.0402
(Destination) (0.0505) (0.0519) (0.0476) (0.0509) (0.0509)
ForeignDebt 0.0567 0.0803∗∗ 0.0518 0.0698∗ 0.0698∗
(Source) (0.0382) (0.0406) (0.0366) (0.0378) (0.0378)
BudgetBalance 0.0801∗∗∗ 0.0561∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗ 0.0524∗ 0.0524∗
(Source) (0.0268) (0.0281) (0.0278) (0.0288) (0.0288)
GovernmentStability 0.0438∗ -0.00370 0.0408∗ -0.00375 -0.00375
(Source) (0.0240) (0.0252) (0.0237) (0.0253) (0.0253)
InternalConflicts 0.0430 -0.0378 0.0527 -0.0379 -0.0379
(Source) (0.0494) (0.0512) (0.0503) (0.0517) (0.0517)
Corruption 0.106 0.215∗∗∗ 0.0936 0.211∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(Source) (0.0758) (0.0818) (0.0735) (0.0800) (0.0800)
cons -12.36∗∗∗ -6.033 -22.75∗∗∗ -16.03∗∗∗ -16.03∗∗∗
(3.554) (3.736) (4.411) (4.747) (4.747)
N 3211 3211 3211 3211 3211
r2 0.737 0.740 0.00000430 0.0176 0.0176
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Source Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of inflow seasonal foreign workers from country i (source
country) to country j (destination country divided by the population in country i) in year t. The data covers yearly
foreign population inflow from 133 source countries (including OECD members) to 34 OECD countries in the 1984-2015
period. The estimation method is GLS estimation. Standard errors, clustered by country-pair, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Model (1) includes a vector
of source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model(2) includes a vector of time, source-country, and
destination-country fixed effects. Model (3) includes a vector of country-pair fixed effects. Model(4) includes a vector
of time, and country-pair fixed effects. Model (5) includes a vector of time, source-country, destination-country, and
country-pair fixed effects.
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Table 4.9: Further Robustness 3: The determines of inflow foreign students with fixed effects
log (inflow foreign students / source country population)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(immigrant stock/source population) 0.330∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗
(0.0348) (0.0328) (0.0966) (0.0973) (0.0973)
lnGDPperHead Ratio (Destination/Source) -5.624∗∗∗ -2.406∗∗ -5.544∗∗∗ -2.472∗∗ -2.472∗∗
(0.937) (1.001) (0.995) (1.127) (1.127)
ldist -0.389∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗
(0.0982) (0.0981)
border -0.521 -0.524
(0.423) (0.424)
colony 1.874∗∗∗ 1.920∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.271)
comlang 0.316 0.355
(0.236) (0.240)
SocioeconomicConditions 0.147∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(Destination) (0.0346) (0.0371) (0.0356) (0.0372) (0.0372)
ForeignDebt 0.0206 -0.00467 0.0172 -0.00528 -0.00528
(Source) (0.0167) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0173)
BudgetBalance 0.0245 0.0111 0.0223 0.00493 0.00493
(Source) (0.0149) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0157)
GovernmentStability -0.0609∗∗∗ -0.0125 -0.0599∗∗∗ -0.0154 -0.0154
(Source) (0.0173) (0.0186) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0186)
InternalConflicts -0.0387∗ -0.00000347 -0.0460∗∗ -0.00342 -0.00342
(Source) (0.0223) (0.0198) (0.0229) (0.0199) (0.0199)
Corruption 0.0237 0.0148 0.0243 0.0170 0.0170
(Source) (0.0406) (0.0423) (0.0401) (0.0420) (0.0420)
cons -4.379∗∗∗ -7.611∗∗∗ -4.241∗∗∗ -9.342∗∗∗ -9.342∗∗∗
(1.200) (1.249) (1.496) (1.710) (1.710)
N 2892 2892 2892 2892 2892
r2 0.807 0.814 0.212 0.335 0.335
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Source Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of inflow foreign students from country i (source
country) to country j (destination country) divided by the population in country i in year t. The data covers
yearly foreign population inflow from 133 source countries (including OECD members) to 34 OECD countries
in the 1984-2015 period. The estimation method is GLS estimation. Standard errors, clustered by country-pair,
are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Model (1) includes a vector of source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model(2) includes a vector
of time, source-country, and destination-country fixed effects. Model (3) includes a vector of country-pair fixed
effects. Model(4) includes a vector of time, and country-pair fixed effects. Model (5) includes a vector of time,
source-country, destination-country, and country-pair fixed effects.
117
Table 4.10: Further Robustness 4: Non-linearity in stock foreign population with random vce
Setting ln(immigrant stock/source population) (t− 1) at
Pooled < 20% 20%− 40% 40%− 60% 60%− 80% > 80%
ln(immigrant stock/source population) 0.617∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(t− 1) (0.0118) (0.0226) (0.0356) (0.0399) (0.0380) (0.0359)
lnGDPperHead Ratio (Destination/Source) 0.598∗ 0.396 0.834 1.626∗∗ 0.546 1.025
(t− 1) (0.309) (0.722) (0.615) (0.642) (0.743) (0.895)
ldist -0.377∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗
(0.0340) (0.113) (0.0674) (0.0604) (0.0563) (0.0629)
border -0.152∗ 0.872∗∗∗ -0.835∗∗∗ -0.00783 0.0632 -0.203∗
(0.0876) (0.261) (0.188) (0.191) (0.119) (0.120)
colony 0.503∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.169∗
(0.0864) (0.115) (0.245) (0.0940)
comlang 0.308∗∗∗ -0.148 0.114 -0.00424 0.179∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗
(0.0490) (0.112) (0.0997) (0.0796) (0.0828) (0.0761)
SocioeconomicConditions (t− 1) 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0882∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(Destination) (0.00795) (0.0243) (0.0180) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0152)
ForeignDebt (t− 1) -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.0189 -0.0174 -0.0172∗∗ -0.00165 -0.0319∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00536) (0.0148) (0.0111) (0.00741) (0.0124) (0.0109)
BudgetBalance (t− 1) -0.0110∗∗ 0.0109 -0.00530 -0.00298 -0.0174∗∗ -0.0287∗∗
(Source) (0.00454) (0.0117) (0.00898) (0.00706) (0.00857) (0.0112)
GovernmentStability (t− 1) -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0247 -0.00951 0.00152 -0.0211∗∗ -0.0199∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00464) (0.0153) (0.0105) (0.00840) (0.00911) (0.00726)
InternalConflicts (t− 1) -0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0250 -0.0116 -0.0470∗∗∗ -0.0161 -0.0417∗∗∗
(Source) (0.00639) (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0130)
Corruption (t− 1) -0.0415∗∗∗ -0.0110 0.0105 -0.0355 -0.0549∗∗ -0.0425∗
(Source) (0.0122) (0.0366) (0.0261) (0.0237) (0.0265) (0.0219)
cons -2.225∗∗∗ -5.586∗∗∗ -3.471∗∗∗ -3.184∗∗∗ -3.614∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.927) (1.168) (1.020) (1.054)
N 30234 3919 6674 6284 6335 7022
r2 0.918 0.825 0.833 0.873 0.892 0.869
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of emigration rate (inflow foreign population from country i (source
country) to country j (destination country) divided by the population in country i) in year t. The values of all the independent
variables are measured in year t−1. lnstockforeign (t-1) measures the natural logarithm of foreign population stock in year t−1.
The data covers yearly foreign population inflow from 133 source countries (including OECD members) to 34 OECD countries in
the 1984-2015 period. The estimation method is GLS estimation. All models include a vector of time, destination-country, and
source-country fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by country-pair, are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Model (1) is the replicate of column 2 in the last table. Model (2) - (6)
considers non-linearity of stock foreign population, each interval represent a 20 percentile of the stock foreign population.
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Table 4.11: Further Robustness 5: The determines of inflow foreign population from OECD origin, and non-OECD
origin.
Source: OECD Source: Non-OECD
t t− 1 t− 1 t t− 1 t− 1
ln(immigrant stock/source population) 0.798∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0236) (0.0341) (0.0138) (0.0135) (0.0218)
lnGDPperHead Ratio (Destination/Source) 1.851 2.141 2.125 0.389 0.235 -0.121
(1.180) (1.360) (1.409) (0.304) (0.342) (0.363)
ldist 0.0553 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗
(0.0531) (0.0540) (0.0413) (0.0452)
border -0.00829 0.00555 0.0591 0.240
(0.0948) (0.0963) (0.146) (0.162)
colony 0.105 0.249 0.246∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.162) (0.0737) (0.0994)
comlang 0.0798 0.176∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.0736) (0.0783) (0.0472) (0.0560)
SocioeconomicConditions 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0792∗∗∗ 0.0799∗∗∗ 0.0951∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(Destination) (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.00956) (0.0104) (0.0103)
ForeignDebt -0.0247∗∗∗ -0.0320∗∗∗ -0.0359∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0180∗∗
(Source) (0.00706) (0.00815) (0.00818) (0.00631) (0.00713) (0.00737)
BudgetBalance -0.0217∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0303∗∗∗ -0.00244 0.00219 0.00184
(Source) (0.00796) (0.00833) (0.00822) (0.00468) (0.00540) (0.00547)
GovernmentStability -0.00832 -0.0135∗ -0.0132∗ -0.0154∗∗∗ -0.0140∗∗ -0.0149∗∗
(Source) (0.00664) (0.00768) (0.00761) (0.00522) (0.00595) (0.00600)
InternalConflicts -0.0106 -0.0200 -0.0228∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0257∗∗∗ -0.0278∗∗∗
(Source) (0.0122) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.00693) (0.00759) (0.00800)
Corruption -0.0614∗∗∗ -0.0900∗∗∗ -0.0976∗∗∗ -0.00635 -0.0221 -0.0255
(Source) (0.0160) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0146) (0.0160) (0.0161)
cons -7.069∗∗∗ -6.078∗∗∗ -7.176∗∗∗ -3.657∗∗∗ -2.236∗∗∗ -7.235∗∗∗
(1.265) (1.459) (1.515) (0.706) (0.759) (0.554)
N 10700 10170 10170 21547 20064 20064
r2 0.924 0.915 0.808 0.933 0.916 0.867
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of inflow foreign population from country i (source country) to
country j (destination country) in year t. In model (2) (3) (5) (6), the values of all the independent variables are measured
in year t − 1. lnstockforeign (t-1) measures the natural logarithm of foreign population stock in year t − 1. The data
covers yearly foreign population inflow from 133 source countries (including OECD members) to 34 OECD countries in the
1984-2015 period. The estimation method is GLS estimation. Standard errors, clustered by country-pair, are in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Model (1)-(3) include only OECD
source countries. Model (4)-(6) include only non-OECD source countries.
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